

The Economic Consequences of Social-Network Structure[†]

MATTHEW O. JACKSON, BRIAN W. ROGERS, AND YVES ZENOU*

We survey the literature on the economic consequences of the structure of social networks. We develop a taxonomy of “macro” and “micro” characteristics of social-interaction networks and discuss both the theoretical and empirical findings concerning the role of those characteristics in determining learning, diffusion, decisions, and resulting behaviors. We also discuss the challenges of accounting for the endogeneity of networks in assessing the relationship between the patterns of interactions and behaviors. (JEL D12, D83, D85, K42, Z13)

1. Introduction

Humans are inherently social beings. We rely on each other for sustenance, safety, governance, information, and companionship. Production, exchange, and consumption of goods and services largely take place in social settings where the patterns and nature of interactions influence, and are influenced by, economic activity. This

embeddedness of many economic transactions means that abstracting from social structure comes with the risk of severely misunderstanding behaviors and their causes.¹ In particular, designing many economic policies requires a deep understanding of social structure. Consider the following representative examples:

- Criminality is often a social behavior and accounting for peer influences and networks of interactions can lead to more effective policies aimed at reducing crime.
- Increasing the employment rate and wages of a disadvantaged group requires understanding that many jobs are obtained via social contacts and the underlying social networks exhibit patterns that can result in persistent inequality and poverty traps.

* Jackson: Department of Economics, Stanford University, the Santa Fe Institute, and CIFAR. Rogers: Department of Economics, Washington University in St. Louis. Zenou: Department of Economics, Monash University, and IFN. We thank the editor Steven Durlauf, two anonymous referees, and Ben Golub for very helpful comments. Matthew Jackson gratefully acknowledges financial support from the NSF under grants SES-0961481 and SES-1155302 and from grant FA9550-12-1-0411 from the AFOSR and DARPA, and ARO MURI award No. W911NF-12-1-0509. Yves Zenou acknowledges financial support from the Swedish Research Council (Vetenskapsrådet) under grant 421-2010-1310, and from the French National Research Agency (ANR) under grant ANR-13-JSH1-0009-01.

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¹ See Granovetter (1985) for a seminal discussion.

- Improving the human-capital investments of a given group must account for the fact that one's decisions regarding education and labor-market participation are often heavily influenced by decisions of family and friends, both through learning and complementarities.
- Integrating schools not just in terms of ethnic or racial composition, but in terms of friendship formation and cross-group interactions, requires understanding when and why students are compelled to seek friendships with others similar to themselves.
- Enhancing new technology adoption requires a proper understanding of how peoples' opinions and beliefs are shaped by word-of-mouth communication.
- Sustaining informal risk sharing and favor exchange depends on social norms and sanctions, and social structure provides new insights into how communities overcome basic incentive problems.

This is, of course, only a partial list of the many economic behaviors that are shaped at a fundamental level by network patterns of interaction. For instance, beyond such "social" networks, other interactions, such as international trade and political alliances, have inherent network structures that shape the impact of policies and help us understand conflict and other inefficiencies. Given the importance of social context and the emerging tools researchers are currently developing to account for it, there has been a rapid growth of analyses of economic behavior that consider social context, appearing in an array of applied and theoretical literatures both within and outside of economics. We do not attempt to provide a comprehensive survey of the economic literature on social networks.² Instead, we provide a framework for

understanding how networks of interactions shape behavior.

Most importantly, there are robust regularities in how network structure relates to behavior: involving the network-based notions of density and distribution of connections, segregation patterns, and the positions of key nodes. Our narrative—using this framework—pulls together major insights that have emerged from empirical and theoretical analyses of how social structure relates to the behaviors and well-being of the people in a society.

We emphasize that the relationship between social structure and economic behavior is not unidirectional, as the relationships that constitute a given network are endogenous and determined partly by economic behaviors. In particular, the symbiotic relationship of social context and behavior complicates empirical analysis, since the relationships among most of the variables of interest are endogenous. It is thus essential for many economic questions to understand how networks form, evolve, and interact with behaviors. From an empirical perspective, these questions arise at a unique time in which large network datasets are rapidly becoming available, along with the computing power to analyze them.

In section 2, we first elaborate on a few specific examples in order to ground the discussion and illustrate our major themes. In section 3, we propose a classification of network characteristics and discuss how they relate to behavior, and we use this classification as the basis for the remainder of the article. Sections 4 through 7 present detailed descriptions of how specific network characteristics relate to economic behavior. In

²Some aspects of networks have been covered in previous surveys. See, in particular, Jackson (2003, 20005a, 2005b,

2011), Ioannides and Datcher Loury (2004), Granovetter (2005), Jackson and Yariv (2011), Jackson and Zenou (2015), as well as the books by Demange and Wooders (2005), Vega-Redondo (2007), Goyal (2007), Jackson (2008b), Benhabib, Bisin, and Jackson (2011), Jackson and Zenou (2013), and Bramoullé, Galeotti, and Rogers (2016).

section 8, we discuss some challenges that arise with empirical analyses in networked settings, devoting particular attention to endogeneity problems, which are ubiquitous in the study of social interactions. We close with a summary and some concluding remarks in section 9.

2. *Illustrative Examples*

In order to ground our discussion, we start by expanding on some of the examples mentioned in the introduction in which network structures are of primary importance in determining behavior. Each of the following four examples illustrates a theme that we elaborate upon below.

First, many criminal behaviors do not occur in isolation, but rather take place in a social context.³ Indeed, criminals often have friends or acquaintances who have themselves committed several offenses. These social ties among criminals can serve as a means whereby individuals actively or passively influence one another to commit crimes. In fact, not only the behavior of direct friends, but also that of the larger structure of an individual's network, predicts criminal behavior. Influence occurs through a number of channels, as criminal behaviors involve many complementarities, including role models, learning, and increased opportunities, which can lead individuals to undertake criminal acts. Moreover, some crimes inherently involve team production (e.g., production and trafficking of illegal drugs and goods) and require criminals to work with accomplices. These complementarities can then feed back and affect the social network in which an individual resides, as

they may constitute relevant components of the decision to invest in relationships. This, in turn, can reinforce behaviors and erode investments in more productive human capital and opportunities.

Second, we observe persistent inequality on a number of dimensions (e.g., wages, promotions, health, etc.) between ethnicities, genders, and other social classes.⁴ Important components of these differences relate to segregation patterns in interaction, as segregation in network structures affects how information flows, what access individuals have to various opportunities, and how decisions are made. In sufficiently segregated networks, different behaviors, norms, and expectations can persist in different communities which, in turn, can have consequences for human capital investments, career choice, and various other behaviors. Once outcomes differ across communities, individuals have different investment incentives since they have different opportunity costs of, and benefits from, education and other decisions. The differences in costs and benefits stem from complementarities in behaviors, as there are often advantages to choosing similar behaviors to our neighbors. For instance, returns to education are higher if one has educated friends who can provide information about the optimal pursuit of an education, and eventually can serve as contacts for access to skilled jobs. So optimal behavior is likely to be different across communities even if underlying preferences are not systematically different. The differences can be reinforced by complementarities and thus become persistent. Hence, it is essential for economists to understand why networks often exhibit strong segregation patterns,

³It is well-established that crime is, to some extent, a group phenomenon, with sources of crime and delinquency that can be traced to the social networks of individuals (see, e.g., Sutherland 1947; Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman 1996; Sarnacki 2001; Warr 2002; Calvó-Armengol and Zenou 2004; and Patacchini and Zenou 2012a).

⁴For example, see Altonji and Blank 1999; Calvo-Armengol and Jackson 2004; Ioannides and Datcher-Loury 2004; List and Rasul 2011; Beaman and Magruder 2012; Beaman, Keleher, and Magruder 2016; and Lelanne and Seabright 2016.

why those structures seem to be so persistent, and how those patterns affect behavior and outcomes. Recent studies have made significant progress on each of these facets.

Third, one of the most extensively studied network phenomena is diffusion. The spreading of ideas, information, behaviors, and diseases, are all network-based phenomena. A most prominent application is from epidemiology: how does a contagious disease spread through a population? Finer details of network structure have only recently been systematically incorporated in answering this kind of question. Features such as segregation, network density, the distribution of links, the joint characteristics of linked individuals, as well as potential changes in the network arising from individuals' reactions to the contagion, are all important to understand. A second application of diffusion centers on technology adoption: When should we expect a new technology to be widely adopted? What do the dynamics of market penetration look like, and what factors determine success or failure of adoption? More generally, it is important to understand which aspects of network structure enhance or impede diffusion. How do the answers to these questions depend on the nature of the diffusion process?

Fourth, and finally, cooperative behavior prevails in some environments, and not others. Particular manifestations of behaviors that require cooperation include informal risk sharing and favor exchange, the provision of various (local) public goods, and economic exchange; all of which matter greatly in the development of a society. These are all inherently network phenomena, as people react to their neighbors and what they hear about others' behaviors. Pro-social behavior is routinely observed, even in contexts with little in the way of formal institutions to provide sanctions. This is true in both the developing world and the developed world, as many interactions are more easily

governed by social sanctions than relying on costly formal contracting. The means of providing appropriate incentives often relies in large part on social structure. For example, information about misbehavior can spread quickly through an individual's network, leading to negative reactions in future interactions for those whose actions conflict with social norms. Social structure plays a prominent role in determining the forms of cooperative behavior that can be maintained.

3. *Classifying Network Characteristics*

With these motivating examples in hand, we now offer a framework through which to understand how structural properties of a network impact the behaviors of the agents who comprise the network.⁵ The framework is based on the fundamental characteristics of networks. We focus on four major characteristics (that we define below for those new to the subject): degree distributions, homophily patterns,⁶ clustering, and the centrality of nodes. Naturally, there are many other facets of such inherently complex structures that can also be important. We focus on these four because they are particularly prominent, fundamental, and provide essential insights.

In discussing impacts of network structure on behavior, it is useful to first divide network characteristics into two categories: (i) those that are at the "macro," "global," or "aggregate" level, and (ii) those that are the "micro," "local," or "individual" scale. For example, the macro/global/aggregate characteristics include those such as the density of links or segregation patterns, while the micro/local/individual characteristics include those such as whether some given person's friends are friends with each other.

⁵ See Jackson (2014).

⁶ Homophily is the tendency of agents to associate with other agents who have similar characteristics.

Although there does not exist an exact split between macro and micro network characteristics, this distinction is useful. The macro/micro distinction allows us to separate fundamentally different sorts of questions. Macro questions address issues that are society-wide, such as identifying the conditions under which a process of contagion is likely to lead to a persistent level of infection, or the extent to which polarized views are likely to coexist in society. The micro questions, on the other hand, address issues that tend to focus on a given individual or a small subset of society, such as how influential a given agent is in shaping the opinions of others, or whether or not two friends have sufficient incentives to exchange favors.

In addition, beyond the pedagogical usefulness of the macro/micro distinction, there is an accompanying methodological distinction. Answers to these different sorts of questions tend to rely on different approaches, with different models, data, and analyses. Finally, the literature has generated distinct insights across these two dimensions. We highlight these differences throughout the exposition.

3.1 *Macro/Global/Aggregate Network Patterns and Behavior*

There are a variety of characteristics through which researchers describe and classify networks when looking at the role of macro/global/aggregate patterns in shaping behavior. We focus on two of the most prominent such characteristics, as they are particularly pertinent in analyzing the impact of network structure on behavior. To simplify the exposition, most of our discussion considers a network of relationships that is represented by a simple graph: two nodes are either connected to each other or not; there is no weight or direction associated with the relationships. Much of what we discuss can be readily extended to the case of weighted, directed, or multiple, links between nodes (see section 3.2.3).

3.1.1 *Degree Distributions*

Each individual in the network has some certain number of connections to other agents: this number is called the agent's "degree." Perhaps the most basic macro characteristic is the *degree distribution*, which is simply the distribution of degrees across the population of agents. As is standard in describing distributions, its basic moments such as mean and variance are vital statistics. The average (mean) degree in society measures the density of links in society, capturing the fraction of possible links between all pairs of nodes that are present in a network. Sometimes it is important to track the full richness of the distribution of degrees across nodes.

Higher moments of the distribution vary across settings, and these are known to have significant consequences for behavior. For example, consider fixing the mean of a degree distribution while increasing its variance. As the variance rises, the distribution puts increasing weight on both low- and high- (relative to the mean) degree nodes. Qualitatively, the network can increasingly resemble a "hub-and-spoke" structure, in which some highly connected nodes take on the role of hubs, whereas many other low-degree nodes typically connect to the hubs. When considering diffusion through a network, higher moments of the degree distribution can have a first-order effect on outcomes. Since hubs are highly connected, they tend to be highly exposed to other nodes, and so can be easily infected by disease or become early adopters of a technology. Next, they are positioned to diffuse the disease or technology to their many connections. Similarly, in the case of social learning, hub-like agents can be well-positioned both to encounter novel information, and also to share it with many others, making them particularly influential in the system. We discuss these points more below.




Figure 1. Fit of Two Degree Distributions

Notes: Lighter shade: Fit of complementary cdf from their model; darker shade: complementary cdf from the data; (left) Notre Dame www dataset from Albert, Jeong, and Barabasi (1999), (right) economics coauthor data set from Goyal, Van Der Leij, and Moraga-Gonzalez (2006). The two degree distributions are quite different in their curvatures, with the web dataset having much fatter tails in the distribution than the coauthor data, which is more regular.

Source: Reprinted from Jackson and Rogers (2007a) with permission of the *American Economic Review*.

In contrast, networks with low variance are closer to being “regular,” in which agents have the same degree. Note, though, that even in perfectly regular networks, it need not be true that all nodes are equally important or influential. Network positions can still be heterogeneous. One implication of this observation is, naturally, that even a degree distribution is not a complete description of a network.

Figure 1 depicts two degree distributions from datasets analyzed in Jackson and Rogers (2007a). In each panel, the log of the proportion of nodes with connectivity of at least the given degree (i.e., the log of the complementary cdf of the degree distribution) is plotted as a function of the log of the degree. The dark curve is the empirical distribution and the lighter curve is the fit obtained from their model of network formation. The depicted datasets in figure 1 are a

portion of the www in which nodes are web pages and links are hyperlinks between pages (left panel) and a network among economics researchers in which individuals are linked if they have coauthored a published paper (right panel). For our present purposes, the most important observation is that the distributions of degree are radically different in the two networks (bearing in mind the effect of the log–log scale). The near-linear pattern in the www network corresponds to a case in which there are relatively more high-degree nodes and low-degree nodes, and relatively fewer nodes with intermediate degrees than in the coauthor network. The www network, in this sense, has more of a “hub-and-spoke” structure, with numerous very highly connected web pages (hubs) and many other far less-connected pages (e.g., see Albert, Jeong, and Barabasi 1999 and Huberman and Adamic 1999). On the other hand, despite

significant heterogeneity across researchers, the coauthor network exhibits relatively more regularity and less variance. Such differences could occur for a number of reasons. For example, one reason is that while time clearly places a constraint on the number of coauthors a researcher is able to collaborate with, there is no obvious counterpart to that constraint in terms of the number of hyperlinks a webpage maintains, thus allowing for the possibility of greater absolute numbers and, therefore, heterogeneity of links. Other reasons include whether nodes meet each other via the network (which gives an advantage to nodes who already have many connections), and the extent to which there is some heterogeneity in the value of connecting to different nodes.

Two of the most prominent degree distributions are the Poisson distribution and the power distribution (or scale-free distribution, related to a Pareto distribution). Both of these distributions arise naturally in many contexts, and are well-understood. These can be thought of as limiting cases, bounding a space of plausible degree distributions, and serve as benchmarks.

The Poisson distribution arises when links are formed uniformly at random (and are not too dense), so that the degree differences across nodes simply reflect the randomness inherent in binomial random variables. This sort of network, analyzed in the seminal work of Erdős and Rényi (1959, 1960), has a binomial degree distribution that is then well-approximated by a Poisson distribution.

Although some observed social and economic networks have Poisson distributions, many have fatter tails than a Poisson distribution, exhibiting more heterogeneity than would arise uniformly at random. At the other extreme, the distribution that exhibits a power law has much greater variation in degrees. It is usually derived from a form of a “rich-get-richer” dynamic, characterized

by a cumulative process in which nodes gain connections in proportion to the number of connections that they already have. In other words, the nodes with the higher degrees are the nodes that gain new links at higher rates, amplifying differences across nodes.⁷ The term “power” reflects the fact that the likelihood of a given number of connections is proportional to the degree raised to a power, which corresponds to a distribution that has an unbounded variance as the number of nodes grows. Power distributions are said to have “fat tails,” as the relative likelihood of very high degree and very low degree are higher than if links were formed uniformly at random and, correspondingly, intermediate-degree nodes are less prevalent than in a distribution with links formed uniformly at random. The term “scale-free” refers to the fact that the relative frequency of nodes with degree d , compared to nodes of degree d' , is the same as the relative frequency of nodes with degree kd compared to nodes of degree kd' , when rescaling by an arbitrary factor $k > 0$.⁸

When one analyzes the degree distributions of many social networks from a statistical perspective, it is often claimed that a “power law” is found. However, it is more accurate to say that many social networks exhibit “fat tails,” as when closely analyzing the distributions, they are often significantly different from both a power distribution and a Poisson distribution, but instead lie somewhere between (e.g., see Jackson and Rogers 2007a). More systematic analysis of how network structures differ across applications, and *why* some applications exhibit certain features that others do not, is still needed. Some of this

⁷See Price (1976), Mitzenmacher (2003), Barabasi and Albert (1999), Jackson and Rogers (2007a), and Jackson (2008b) for more on processes leading to each of these, as well as other, degree distributions.

⁸Observing that the distribution has the form $f(d) = cd^{-\gamma}$, it follows that $f(d)f(d') = (d/d')^{-\gamma} = f(kd)f(kd')$.

can be traced to network formation models, which offer predictions as to why network structure depends on specific aspects of how they form. However, the connection between the formation process and what is observed in different applications from an empirical standpoint is still mostly anecdotal. This is an important area for further work, since differences network structures (such as degree distributions) have important implications for diffusion processes, as we discuss shortly.

3.1.2 *Assortativity and Correlations in Degrees*

In this subsection and the next, we briefly discuss ways in which the properties of one's neighbors vary with one's own characteristics. We think of these as macro-level properties, since the idea is to capture these dependencies at the aggregate level in a society. We begin here by posing the question: are highly connected nodes more likely to be connected to other high-degree nodes, and low-degree nodes with other low-degree nodes? The answer is frequently affirmative (e.g., see Newman 2003; Jackson and Rogers 2007a). One explanation for this phenomenon, known as (positive) assortativity, is that nodes are born at different times, introducing certain correlations as a function of age. For instance, academics initiate their research careers at different points in time. Older researchers have had more opportunities to collaborate with other researchers (tending to give them higher degree) and also relatively more opportunities to collaborate with other older researchers, producing a positive correlation in the degrees of connected nodes. This is true of a variety of settings in which nodes and connections accumulate in tandem over time (e.g., see Jackson and Rogers 2007a; Jackson 2008b). Assortativity patterns turn out to have implications for time patterns in homophily (Bramoullé et al. 2012) as well as contagion processes

(Newman 2002; Jackson and Lopez-Pintado 2013).⁹

3.1.3 *Homophily and Segregation Patterns among Nodes*

The degree distribution is a purely structural characteristic that it is invariant to relabeling the nodes in a network. Yet, in social and economic contexts, actors generally come with relevant attributes, such as ethnicity, gender, age, education, experience, interests, income, etc., and those attributes are often related to the interaction pattern in systematic ways. It is frequently the case that individuals are more likely to be linked to others who share similar characteristics. This phenomenon is known as *homophily*, and it refers to the fairly pervasive observation in working with social networks that having similar characteristics (age, race, religion, profession, education, etc.) is often a strong and significant predictor of two individuals being connected (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001).¹⁰ This means that social networks can, and often do, exhibit strong segregation patterns: since most of the links connect similar nodes, there are relatively fewer links connecting nodes of different types. Segregation can occur because of the decisions of the people involved and/or by forces that affect the ways in which they meet and have opportunities to interact (Carrarini, Jackson, and Pin 2009, 2010; Tarbush and Teytelboym 2014). Clearly, capturing homophily requires one to model or at least explicitly account for characteristics

⁹It is worth noting that there are also disassortative (negatively assortative, in which high-degree nodes tend to be connected to low-degree nodes) networks. For instance, disassortativity has been found in some patterns of trading relationships (e.g., Bernard, Moxnes, and Ulltveit-Moe 2014 and Blum, Claro, and Horstmann 2009). These networks are such that hubs tend to be connected to relatively isolated nodes.

¹⁰Note that if one considers degree to be such an attribute; e.g., as a proxy of "popularity," then assortativity can be viewed as a particular form of homophily.




Figure 2. A Network of the Friendships in a High School

Source: Data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Adolescent Health (Add Health).

of nodes that exhibit a dimension of heterogeneity across the population. Homophily, and other segregation patterns, mean that two networks that have the same degree distribution might have strikingly different properties in terms of how different groups of nodes interconnect with each other. This can have profound implications for how behaviors are chosen and evolve over time.

Consider, for example, figure 2, which depicts a friendship network among high-school students in the United States (from the National Longitudinal Survey of Adolescent Health—“Add Health”). It turns out that the (self-reported) friendships are strongly

related to ethnicity, with students of the same ethnicity being significantly more likely to be connected to each other than students of different ethnicities. If one is interested in how information spreads through social learning, such homophily patterns are important to understand. As homophily increases, the propensity for a diffusion to gain hold within a particular group rises, sometimes at the expense of the speed and extent of diffusion throughout the entire population, as we discuss in more detail below. Further, given sufficiently strong homophily, one can imagine different norms or cultures emerging, e.g., regarding cooperative behavior, and so different groups

may have quite different outcomes. It could also be that, in a diffusion context, different prevalences will be sustained in different areas of the network, which in turn can lead to welfare and behavioral differences across groups.

3.1.4 *Component and Community Structures*

We now turn to discussing how the structure of a network dictates the shape and characteristics of the community that surrounds a given agent. A basic concept is that of a network component; i.e., a set of nodes such that all pairs have at least one path connecting them, and such that the addition of any other node breaks this connectedness property. So a component is a maximal set of path-connected nodes. An easy way to think about finding the component structure of a network is via the following algorithm. Start from any agent, and examine each of her links to find all of her neighbors. Then, from each neighbor, repeat the process, and continue from the next set of nodes that are reached, and so on. Assuming there are a finite number of nodes, this process is guaranteed to reach a state after which no new nodes can be found, at which point the current set of nodes that have been reached form a component. Repeating this process starting from a node that was not included in the first component will then identify a second component, and so on, until the full component structure of the network has been identified.

The number of components that a network separates into, and the size distribution of those components, has implications for various processes, especially diffusion processes. In particular, there is a strong sense in which a network with many small components can be thought of as being more segregated than a network with fewer and larger components. In the limit,

one obtains a network in which all nodes belong to the same component, which is often simply referred to as being “path connected” or, more simply, “connected.” In a path-connected network, it is possible, depending on the particular process in question, for information or behaviors to spread from any node to any other node, given enough time. On the other hand, for networks with many small components, information or behavior that originates among nodes in one component has no natural way to spread to nodes in other components (presuming that the network describes the feasible avenues of diffusion).

From a theoretical perspective, the number and sizes of components has been extensively studied in the context of relatively simple random graph models (e.g., see Bollobás 2001). A straightforward insight is that, having higher probabilities of links existing between any two nodes is likely to result in a network with fewer and larger components than one formed with lower probabilities of links between any two nodes, which is simply an expression of the fact that additional links will occasionally connect two nodes who otherwise would have been in separate components and, following the addition of that “bridge,” the two components merge. What is perhaps more surprising, and applies to many random graph models, is that changing the probabilities by relatively small amounts can lead to dramatic changes in the component structure. This happens because the number of links grows quadratically in the number of nodes, and so slight increases in the probability per link can lead to much higher probabilities that at least one pair of nodes from two different groups ends up having a relationship. Thus, as a graph becomes denser, one property that emerges is the existence of a giant component (i.e., a component that incorporates a nontrivial proportion of nodes), even in the limit as the population grows without bound, and which

dwarfs the next largest component.¹¹ In the classic Erdős-Rényi random graph model, for example, there is a phase transition in the linking probability such that a giant component emerges sharply beyond that threshold. Above this threshold, one can further study the expected size of the giant component and, more generally, the distribution of sizes of all of the components in the graph (again, see Bollobás 2001).

Beyond a study of component structure, there can also be more subtle, but distinct, “community structures” within a network. For example, there may be various “types” of agents (e.g., based on ethnicity, age, profession, etc.), such that agents of the same type are more likely to connect with each other, whereas agents of other types are less likely to connect with each other. A natural question is then whether these type-based communities can be identified from looking at the network data (see Copic, Jackson, and Kirman 2009 and Porter, Onnela, and Much 2009). Beyond detecting such type-based communities, there is a large literature on trying to detect communities within networks (whether based on types or not) and many algorithms for doing so (see Newman 2004 for an early survey).

Finally, there is great scope for studying finer correlation patterns within a given network. The literature has paid relatively less attention to such questions, but one can imagine, e.g., structures that originate due to different kinds of links jointly defining a network. Such a “multigraph” approach may prove useful in thinking about patterns in a network where, say, some links represent friendships, whereas others represent professional relationships, etc.

¹¹ Having two large components becomes very unlikely in a large random network, since it would require that none of the many possible bridges across the two large components forms; noting that the number of possible bridges between the components is equal to the product of the numbers of nodes in each of the components.

3.1.5 *Average Distance and Network Diameters*

The final category of macro network properties that we discuss concerns the distance between nodes, where distance is measured according to the network topology. That is, the distance between any two nodes in a network is the number of links along the shortest path between two nodes (and is typically taken to be infinite if the nodes are in separate components). If one considers a network of individuals in which a link represents the ability to communicate, the distance between a given pair of individuals is the number (plus one) of intermediaries through which a message must pass in order to get from one individual to the other. More generally, the distance between nodes has important economic consequences, playing a role in dictating the speed of learning or diffusion, the efficiency of exchange and trade, and the accuracy of communicating information.

A well-studied and robust regularity of social networks is that they have short average distances between nodes, even in very large and quite sparse networks. The seminal experiments of Stanley Milgram (Milgram 1967) asked individuals to send a letter to a personal acquaintance, with the goal of the letter being passed on and eventually reaching a target recipient who was a great geographic distance from, and unknown to, the initial individual. Even though participants were given little information about the target, many of the letters eventually reached their targets, with median and average numbers of hops needed being around five or six. Milgram’s experiments were conducted on the population of the United States; given the size and sparsity of connections (Milgram defined a link in terms of “first-name basis”) the short lengths of the realized path lengths were impressive.

This kind of experiment has been implemented more recently via email (Dodds,

Muhamad, and Watts 2003), and on social media sites (e.g., Backstrom et al. 2012). The main finding of these studies replicates the essence of Milgram's thesis, namely, that when asked to forward a message to a personal acquaintance, with the goal of eventually reaching a given target, a message typically has to pass through a remarkably small number of individuals, even in very large and sparse networks. This finding may be surprising for two separate reasons. First there is the basic issue of whether or not a short path exists between randomly chosen pairs of individuals, who are typically geographically and demographically diverse. But given that such a path exists, it is still far from obvious how individuals are able to navigate the network and find such a path with highly incomplete information about the network structure. What these experiments show is that people are often able to forward the messages in a way that reaches the target relatively efficiently without knowing much about the larger network.

The findings of these experiments, while surprising, are robust. The existence of short paths is well-understood from a theoretical perspective, too. The main observation to bear in mind is that, when links are sparse, a random network tends to have very few cycles, so that a tree structure underlies the network. This means that, starting from any node and successively tracing all the paths emanating from that node, one reaches exponentially many others as a function of the number of links one moves outward—and so the typical path length tends to vary in proportion to the log of the number of nodes in the network. Another way to see this relationship is to note that the number of potential paths of length two between a pair of nodes is $n - 2$ (any other node could serve as an intermediary). So, the only way that those two nodes are not connected by such a path is if *all* of those possible paths fail to exist. Similarly, there are $(n - 2)(n - 3)/2$

possible paths of length three between a pair of nodes, and so for them to be at a distance of more than three, additionally, all of those paths also have to fail to exist as well. The number of possible paths between two nodes expands exponentially with the distance in this way, and so it quickly becomes unlikely for all such paths to fail to exist unless links become quite rare. Theorems bounding distances by such methods have been proven for increasingly rich network models, starting from simple ones (Erdős and Rényi 1959), to ones with richer degree distributions (Chung and Lu 2002), to ones rewired from networks with high clustering (Watts and Strogatz 1998), to ones with rich sets of node characteristics and homophily (Jackson 2008a).

The finding that subjects are able to utilize short paths in a network is remarkable because people often have poor knowledge of networks beyond their immediate friendships (e.g., see Friedkin 1983; Krackhardt 1987, 2014; Banerjee, Chandrasekhar, Duflo, and Jackson 2014). Nonetheless, even though people do not know the details of the network, they typically use information related to geography, occupation, and other demographics, and forward messages to others who share characteristics with the target (see Watts 2016, as well as Kleinberg 2000a, 2000b). So, homophily actually helps in navigation, and people instinctively take advantage of it.

The combination of empirical and theoretical studies has shown that even very large and relatively sparse societies are “small” in terms of the average distances in their networks. Given that links often represent the possibility of transmission of a disease or information, or the possibility to pass on a learned behavior, this understanding suggests why things can spread across an entire population very quickly.

Although average path length is clearly a useful summary statistic, there are other

measures of distance that are often considered when one desires richer information about the spectrum of distances in a network, just as average degree is informative of, but does not completely describe, the degree distribution. While describing the full distribution of distances across pairs of nodes is a formidable task—much more so than for degree, as it happens—one measure that is tractable to estimate is the maximum distance across all pairs of nodes in a network, which is termed the network’s *diameter*. While precise expressions for diameter are generally difficult to obtain in many network models, it is possible to identify and prove bounds on the diameter in some growing random graph models (Bollobás and Riordan 2004), as well as some strategic network formation models (Jackson and Rogers 2005). Indeed, diameters tend to be small in random graphs for the reasons cited above, whereas it is for very different reasons that diameters are low for networks in which individuals choose links strategically. When people choose links and obtain higher value from having shorter paths to other individuals, diameters become limited because if the diameter were sufficiently large, then one could find two individuals who are quite distant in the network who would therefore see sufficiently large benefits to connecting to each other and greatly shortening many paths in the network. Diameters are directly useful for providing bounds for some diffusion processes that travel via shortest paths. Further, just as the component structure of a network places limits on the extent of diffusion, the diameter of a network places limits on how long processes can take to reach the entire network.

3.2 Micro/Local/Individual Network Analyses and Behavior

On the micro side, we identify three main perspectives that have received extensive attention. Each of these perspectives are

fundamental to understanding behavior in networks and continue to generate important new insights.

3.2.1 Clustering and Support

The first perspective focuses on *clustering* patterns of links. Essentially, clustering is a measure of the local correlation or dependence among the locations of links. To what extent is the presence of a link correlated with the presence of nearby links? Roughly, under independence, links would be uniformly distributed across the graph, whereas under dependence, links would form in locally dense regions creating clusters.¹²

The importance of clustering traces back to the pioneering social network research of Simmel (1908). Coleman (1988) provides specific discussion of the role of clustering (or more general forms of “closure”) in enforcing social norms.

There are various related statistics in the literature that have been used to capture this basic notion of clustering and two of these are as follows. One is the frequency with which neighbors of any given node tend to be neighbors of each other, which is referred to as a *clustering coefficient* or *transitivity*.¹³

In figure 3 (left), the clustering coefficient of node i measures, across all pairs of nodes j and k that are each connected to i , the proportion of pairs that are connected to each other. The second distinct, but related, measure is whether or not two linked nodes have some third node to which they are both connected. In figure 3 (right), this measure asks, for a pair of neighbors i and j , whether there exists at least one node k that is connected

¹²Clustering can appear in cases of extreme homophily, even with independence—simply because links form among groups of individuals who all have the same characteristics (e.g., see Graham 2014). However, correlation persists in many settings, even after conditioning on nodal characteristics (e.g., see Jackson, Rodriguez-Barraguer, and Tan 2012).

¹³See Jackson (2008b) for more detailed definitions.




Figure 3.

Notes: Left: clustering—what fraction of node i 's neighbors, j and k , are neighbors of each other? Right: support—what fraction of links ij have a neighbor in common?

to both i and j . This measure of having a “friend in common” or “shared neighbor” is also termed “support” by Jackson, Rodriguez-Barraquer, and Tan (2012), who study its role in providing incentives for individuals i and j to act cooperatively in a relationship, with the interpretation that a common neighbor can help support the provision of incentives in a relationship.

Although clustering and support both relate to the presence of “triangles” or “triads” in a network, they are different concepts. To make the point starkly, as illustrated in figure 4, one can have a network for which every link is supported, and yet have the clustering of some nodes be more limited. Indeed, in this network all links are supported and so the support measure is one. However, only one-third of the pairs of friends of the most central agent are friends with each other (e.g., considering the middle-most node 1 and his neighbors 2, 3, 4, and 5, we see that 2 is a friend of 3, but not of 4 or 5, etc.). Thus, the clustering in this network is much lower than the support measure.

While there are various formal definitions that relate to clustering, it is nonetheless true across definitions that social networks tend

to exhibit higher correlations in local linkings than would be predicted by a model in which links are formed independently across pairs of nodes at random. For example, Newman (2003) discusses several large coauthor networks and finds total clustering coefficients of 0.496 for computer science—so that on average almost 50 percent of the coauthors of a computer science researcher in the data are coauthors of each other—and 0.43 for physics. One factor to keep in mind for coauthorship networks is that whenever a paper has more than two authors, triads are necessarily created, and this will cause clustering and support measures to increase. A similar mechanism is at play whenever links are generated through participation in small groups. Even so, note that, given the sparsity of these networks (i.e., low link densities overall), the clustering coefficients would be dramatically smaller if there were no correlations in presence of links across triads of nodes. Moreover, such high clustering appears in many contexts that do not involve the explicit formation of groups or teams.

We note that clustering and support, although inherently local phenomena, are often measured in the aggregate. For




Figure 4. A Network with Support Equal to One, but Clustering Well Below One

Notes: Every two linked nodes are supported (they have at least one neighbor in common), while the middle five nodes each have many neighbors who are not connected to each other.

instance, researchers often aggregate clustering coefficients across nodes to arrive at a measure of average clustering for the network as a whole. Nonetheless, as their implications for behavior operate on a local level, we find it more natural to think of them in the micro category. In particular, these sorts of local patterns of interaction are important in providing incentives for individuals to behave in certain ways, as such patterns determine who is aware of a given individual's behavior. For instance, if one person cheats another person and they have a friend in common, then that friend in common can react with some punishment, as we discuss in more detail below.

In principle, the intuitive notion of clustering is aimed at capturing the extent to which links tend to gravitate together to bring sets of nodes into close and dense contact with others, such that one tends to observe both

short path lengths as well as the presence of redundant paths. Redundancy is also economically important. For example, if links represent a stochastic transmission of information, then the probability that the information gets from one node to another increases with the presence of redundant paths, all else equal. For the most part, the statistical measures that have been developed to capture clustering tend to focus exclusively on triads—groups of exactly three nodes at a time. While certainly useful, it seems reasonable to conjecture that the clustering properties of a graph may have features that cannot be captured by imposing the limitations implied by these measures. Thus, one possible direction for research is to develop other ways to meaningfully, yet parsimoniously, capture the extent and consequences of more general or flexible clustering in a network.

3.2.2 Centrality Measures

A second category of micro-level analysis quantifies and measures the *centrality* of a node in a network. The qualitative idea is to identify the extent to which a node is centrally located in a network. While intuitive at a general level, it turns out that the appropriate notion of centrality is tied to the details of an application. Indeed, centrality may relate to a node's potential power, influence, or prestige. While related, these are distinct concepts that differ across applications. The literature has thus developed numerous different measures of centrality, each having its own logic and domain of relevance.

In particular, there is a taxonomy of four major classes of centrality measures.¹⁴ Perhaps the most basic one is (i) simply counting how many connections a given node has, i.e., using degree to capture centrality. This may be thought of as a measure of the popularity of a node, and so its immediate influence or the number of other nodes that it can contact. There are many richer definitions of centrality that keep track of: (ii) how close a given node is to others, on average, where close is again in the sense of network topology, and so how quickly it can reach other nodes, or (iii) the extent to which a given node is a critical connector lying on many paths between other nodes or forms a bridge between other groups of nodes, or (iv) the extent to which a given node is well connected to other important nodes. In this last case, notice that “importance” becomes a recursive notion, as the importance of one's neighbors is a function of the importance of their neighbors, and so on. Thus, quantifying centrality in this last category typically requires solving a system of equations (e.g., involving an eigenvector calculation) that grows with the

size of the population. These richer measures of centrality (or reach, bridging, influence, etc.) are relevant in part because they have implications for the seeding of diffusion processes, or a node's impact as an intermediary in various transactions, as we discuss below.

As with clustering, the various measures that the literature has proposed for capturing centrality have proven very useful, but are not yet comprehensive—certainly continued research will develop further aspects of centrality. As mentioned, the intuitive goal is to capture how important a given node is by virtue of its position in the network. The subtleties arise because “importance” is highly dependent on context. If one is studying epidemiological diffusion, then the measure needs to capture the extent to which a node contributes to the spread of a disease. On the other hand, if one is studying a game with local complementarities, importance may instead be aimed at the extent to which one individual's actions influence the actions of many other agents. A position that is central under one notion may not be particularly central under another notion. In principle, the range of centrality notions is potentially as broad as the range of applications one considers. This leaves much room for methodological studies that characterize various centrality measures in terms of the properties they satisfy, and to propose new measures as well (see Dequiedt and Zenou 2014; Bloch, Jackson, and Tebaldi 2015 for some recent examples). We discuss how distinctions between centrality measures are becoming evident from empirical studies in section 7.

3.2.3 Tie Strength and Multigraphs

In many studies, both empirical and theoretical, connections between individuals are coded as binary quantities: either present or absent. In many contexts, such a formulation is adequate to capture the phenomena

¹⁴This builds from Jackson (2008b). Earlier discussions and taxonomies can be found in Freeman (1978–79) and Borgatti (2005).

that one wants to understand, and given the advantages of tractability this is expedient. On the other hand, binary links are clearly an abstraction. In some contexts, forcing the relationship between two individuals to be coded as either “on” or “off” may obscure important aspects of the process under consideration. For example, if one is studying opinion formation, it may be that a given individual pays attention to a number of sources, but puts significantly more weight on the opinions of some contacts relative to others. If one wants to understand the evolution of this individual’s opinion, it would be important to capture the heterogeneity in these links. Generally, the way this is done is to assign weights, or strengths, to every link. Then one can, for example, formally model the network by writing down a matrix where each element captures the intensity or frequency of the relationship from one node to another. It may also be important to encode the flexibility to have asymmetric, or directed, links in which one node may link to another without that link being (fully or partially) reciprocated. Returning to the example of opinion formation, it may well be that one person puts high weight on the opinion of another, but this second person puts little or no weight on the first person’s opinion.

One simple way to incorporate a basic form of link heterogeneity is to allow for a distinction between “strong” and “weak” links. In fact, such an approach has been quite influential, especially from an empirical perspective. This influence derives in part from the findings in the pioneering work of Granovetter (1973, 1974), where it is argued that weak ties can be of particular importance in passing information through a network, as many job referrals (and hence, ultimately, jobs themselves) are passed across weak ties with significant frequency. Individuals who are acquainted but do not have a close personal relationship can, and

often do, provide valuable information to each other.¹⁵

Related to how one chooses to conceive of the strength of connections is a consideration of the timing of interactions in relationships. The frequency with which people interact can vary both across relationships, exhibiting significant heterogeneity across the population,¹⁶ as well as over time, so that they may be nonstationary. There is some evidence that interactions exhibit nonstationarities (e.g., Barabasi 2011) of this sort, and understanding the dynamics of interactions is an increasingly active area of research.

Another way in which one can enrich the coding of a network is via a multigraph; i.e., by keeping track of multiple types of relationships that may simultaneously exist between pairs of nodes. A person may have one person from whom she would ask to borrow money when necessary, and a different friend to whom she would turn for advice; or these two relationships could be with the same person. More generally the idea is that, for some applications, understanding how individuals interact with and influence each other requires one to understand, and collect data on, several different kinds of relationships. In fact, many network datasets include multiple sorts of relationships (e.g., Banerjee et al. 2013), which encode richer information than simply identifying whether two people are close or not. Furthermore, we emphasize that the idea of a multigraph can result in very different conclusions than thinking in terms of a strong/weak dimension, as it could be that a pair who share only one type of relationship interact regularly and frequently and have a strong relationship, and another

¹⁵Weak ties have also been shown to be important in criminal behaviors (Patacchini and Zenou 2008) and migration decisions (Giulietti, Wahba, and Zenou 2014). For some background on the empirics of weak ties in the labor market, see Topa (2011).

¹⁶In fact, frequency was part of Granovetter’s operational definition of strength.

pair who share multiple relationships interact very infrequently and may be thought of as having a weak connection.¹⁷

3.3 *The Blur Between Micro and Macro Measures*

Before proceeding, we remind the reader that, as we have hinted throughout this section, our macro and micro distinction is not always completely clear-cut. For instance, recursive formulations of centrality measures that are used in a micro analysis require one to consider aspects of the entire network. Thus, although one might focus on how some individual's position matters—a decidedly micro analysis—the relevant measure of that person's position could be based on information about the network that extends beyond that individual's local neighborhood. In this sense, although the focus may be micro-oriented, it could nonetheless involve global aspects of the network. Hence, the distinction is not always a bright line. Nevertheless, it is still useful to distinguish whether one is examining the roles and behaviors of specific individuals or small groups of individuals (a micro/local/individual analysis), as compared to overall structure of the network and its societal implications (a macro/global/aggregate analysis). This distinction correlates well with the kind of analyses and models researchers use.

¹⁷There could be a conflict between two activities and associated norms. Consider, for example, crime and education, and their respective networks. On the one hand, in the crime network individuals are sometimes induced to commit crime by their criminal peers, while in the education network they are induced to study harder by their peers. If these two networks are different so that peers are also different, then there can be a conflict between these two activities. See Chen, Zenou, and Zhou (2015) for such an analysis and Cohen-Cole, Liu, and Zenou (2015) for an empirical application.

4. *A Basic Macro Analysis of Network Structure and Behavior: Density and Degree Distributions*

Network density, referring to the fraction of possible links that are present in a graph (accounting for weights if necessary), relative to population size, is a basic and fundamental property. Its properties have implications across a wide range of settings, including contagious diseases, industrial organization, research and development, security and vulnerability, and various diffusion processes. In order to provide some focus to our exposition, we discuss the important implications of network connectivity for diffusion, one of the most prominent and pervasive applications of network analysis, as it illustrates many of the important insights. These insights have wide implications to more specific topics related to diffusion including learning, epidemics, opinion formation, and financial contagions.¹⁸ This wide applicability is in large part responsible for the significant interest in exploring diffusion processes. Finally, diffusion processes tie in very closely to the basic architecture of a population's network, and so very cleanly illustrate how density and degree distributions affect transmission. Although density and degree distributions are of paramount importance to many applications, due to space constraints, we limit our discussion to diffusion processes.

In a canonical diffusion process, a disease, piece of information, behavior, opinion, or product is introduced to a small fraction of the population. Let us focus on the case of a disease, which, after being introduced, spreads through the population across links in the network, according to a given, often stochastic, process. There may also be a decay process such that the disease dies off from infected individuals at some rate. One

¹⁸For surveys see Jackson and Yariv (2011) and Lamberson (2016).

typically wants to understand if the disease eventually dies out, or if instead it becomes endemic in a population and, if so, what proportion of agents are infected in the long run.

Not surprisingly, the density of connections in a network is well-known to be a critical determinant of the contagion of communicable diseases and of the diffusion of a new product. A fairly obvious effect is that denser networks, all else held equal, enhance contagion and diffusion processes (Anderson and May 1992; Rogers 1995; Colizza and Vespignani 2007). Greater numbers or frequency of interactions lead to increased opportunities for spreading diseases, information, and experiences. This conclusion has recently been established for a variety of diffusion processes (Jackson and Rogers 2007b and Lopez-Pintado 2008) and confirmed via careful statistical analyses of some processes in field studies of learning and diffusion (e.g., Alatas et al. 2016).

Of particular interest are the comparative statics of how contagion depends on changes to the network structure. For example, if we compare the same diffusion process occurring separately on two different networks, how does the extent of diffusion depend on the differences in connectivity between the two networks, all else held equal? It turns out that diffusion processes often exhibit sharp phase transitions: there is a critical threshold in connectivity such that on networks with connectivity slightly below that level a diffusion will die out and not take hold in a society, whereas slightly above that threshold the diffusion can be extensive. It is thus possible that two societies with slightly different densities could experience very different responses to the same diffusion process (e.g., Watts 2002; Lopez-Pintado 2008).

One can see some of the basic insights behind this sort of phase transition in the original random graph formation models of Solomonoff and Rapoport (1951) and Erdős

and Rényi (1959, 1960) (see Bollobás 2001 for details). In that framework, links are formed independently across pairs of nodes according to a given probability. One of the important objects of analysis in that framework is the existence and size of a giant component—a component of individuals who are path connected and comprise a majority of individuals in the network—as the group size gets arbitrarily large. As mentioned, the emergence of a giant component occurs sharply across a threshold in the probability that links are formed, treated as a function of the size of the population. This probability is the relevant notion of density for this model, since it specifies the expected proportion of possible links that will form. The interest in the giant component, for our present purpose, is that when link probabilities are low enough that a giant component fails to exist, then the possibility for diffusion to a large portion of the society is naturally limited by the component structure of the network and, in particular, the fact that a randomly chosen pair of agents are very unlikely to have a path connecting them in the graph. On the other hand, when there exists a giant component, then widespread diffusion has the potential to occur.¹⁹

While studying how changes in the density of a network impact a diffusion process delivers intuitive results, it is important to clarify what is meant by density outside of the confines of the random graph models

¹⁹One can tune the link probability to incorporate a probability that two connected individuals would communicate with each other. For instance, an agent might have thousands of acquaintances, but might only interact with dozens of them during a limited time period in which he or she is contagious. From that perspective, tuning link densities to represent the number of per-period interactions would be the right approach for an empirical estimation. Modern epidemiological models are quite intricate, tracking travel patterns and geography, heterogeneity in individuals, and interactions via schools, mass transportation, health care, and others—mostly via simulation due to limited tractability. But some of the basic insights from random graph models still underlie those models.

just discussed. In a world in which every agent is treated identically, the notion of density is straightforward: the number of connections per agent (per time) is a simple measure. However, in a world with heterogeneity in numbers of connections, the notion of density must be treated more carefully. In certain cases, one can make an unambiguous comparison such as, for instance, a situation in which all nodes have increased connectivity. But more generally, knowing only that one society has a greater *average* connectivity than another does not necessarily allow one to conclude that it is more conducive to diffusion—other aspects of the degree distribution are important as well. In other words, when considering a change from a baseline degree distribution to a new distribution in which some nodes gain additional links while other nodes lose links, one cannot make clear-cut conclusions simply by comparing the change in average degree.

Analytically, a concept that allows one to pin down the effects of a degree distribution change on diffusion outcomes is that of first order stochastic dominance (FOSD). One degree distribution FOSDs another if, for every possible absolute level of connectivity, the proportion of agents who have at least that degree rises. The nature of the results mentioned above, in which an increased density leads to higher diffusion outcomes, typically apply to random networks that are ordered in the sense of first order stochastic dominance. Some of those results have been verified in empirical work. For example, studying 631 villages in Indonesia, Alatas et al. (2016) have verified that if a network's degree distribution FOSDs another's distribution, then there is better information aggregation on poverty status within the network; i.e., there is an overall lower error rate in ranking the income distribution of the people in the network—consistent with earlier theoretical predictions (e.g., Jackson and Rogers 2007b).

It is important to note that, since FOSD is a very structured relationship, it does not always allow one to compare two degree distributions, thus leaving open the question of how a diffusion process may respond to general changes in the degree distribution.

Even though the FOSD notion of density operates on the full distribution of connectivity in a society, it is still concerned primarily with the aggregate level of connections across a society, as opposed to finer details regarding how that connectivity is distributed—such as the variance of those connections. Some less-expected insights of how network structure impacts diffusion and contagion processes emerge when focusing on changes in higher moments of the degree distribution. More precisely, one tool that has been used in the literature is that of a mean-preserving spread, which, in a strong sense increases the variation in connectivities while holding average connectivity fixed. Taking a mean-preserving spread thus has the effect of increasing the frequencies of both highly connected agents and also poorly connected agents, leaving fewer agents with near-average connectivity. Under a mean-preserving spread, a network will consist of more and stronger hubs, which are conducive to diffusion, but also more poorly connected agents, who are less exposed to, and able to spread, diffusion. How will a society's susceptibility to diffusion change as a result of these opposing forces?

One main finding is that a mean-preserving spread can increase the susceptibility of a population to contagion and diffusion. Such a result demonstrates that the effect of increasing the prevalence of hubs dominates the effect of increasing the numbers of poorly connected nodes. To prove such a result, one typically leverages the fact that highly connected nodes serve as hubs of transmission for two separate reasons. First, they are quite likely to come in contact with the diffusion by virtue of their high level of

exposure. Second, when infected they are then likely to spread the transmission to many other agents. These effects are often stronger than the countervailing effect that poorly connected nodes become harder to infect and less likely to transmit the diffusion. From these intuitions, one can see that the presence of even a few very highly connected hubs can serve to keep a contagion active quite robustly. This conclusion has been reached in the context of simple contagions (Pastor-Satorras and Vespignani 2001), more complicated diffusions that involve strategic complementarities such as in new product adoption (Jackson and Yariv 2005; Jackson and Rogers 2007b; Jackson and Yariv 2007; Lopez-Pintado 2008; and Galeotti et al. 2010), and has even been found to enhance a population's ability to coordinate its actions in voting settings (Kearns et al. 2009).²⁰

Note that, even when a society becomes more *susceptible* to a contagion process remaining endemic as a result of a mean-preserving spread of the degree distribution, it is not obvious that one should generally expect a higher *prevalence* in the long run. That is, there may well not be a clear sense in which a mean-preserving spread unambiguously translates into “higher” diffusion outcomes. The reason goes back to the higher proportion of poorly connected nodes along with the additional hubs. It can well be that a mean-preserving spread makes it easier for a society to sustain a diffusion, due to the increased role of hubs, but at the same time, it lowers the expected prevalence of the diffusion, since there are more hard-to-reach nodes (see Jackson and Rogers 2007b). In this case, the society is more susceptible to contagions remaining endemic, as the hubs

are continually being infected and spreading it to others, but a high proportion of the population is nonetheless only rarely infected, as the exposure of poorly connected nodes is very limited. So there can be a sense in which the contagion actively infects a small proportion of agents, creating a strong disparity in outcomes for agents as a function of their positions in the network. Whether or not the prevalence responds positively or negatively to a mean-preserving spread depends on further details of the characteristics of the diffusion process and degree distribution (see Galeotti and Rogers 2015).²¹

It is also worth noting that, while it has received less attention in the context of diffusion, compared to treatments of degree distributions, assortativity also can impact diffusion. For example, if highly connected nodes—the hubs—tend to be connected to other highly connected nodes, then their tendency to enable an endemic infection can be amplified. Notice that one may also expect the presence of assortativity to strengthen the possibility that, while becoming more susceptible to infection, a network experiencing a mean-preserving spread may have a quite low prevalence if many poorly connected nodes are mostly connected (sparsely) only to each other.

More generally, there are many settings in which there are richer aspects to how diffusion occurs on a local level. It is important to distinguish between simple “mechanical” sorts of diffusion processes, in which individuals' behaviors are either passive or taken to be exogenous, from more complex processes in which, for example, people must interpret possibly heterogeneous information that they hear from others (as in social learning)

²⁰A general approach to using stochastic dominance of degree distributions to rank contagion and diffusion processes was developed in several contexts by Jackson and Yariv (2005), Jackson and Rogers (2007b), and Jackson and Yariv (2007) (see more discussion in Jackson and Yariv 2011 and further development in Lamberson 2011).

²¹There is great scope for extending diffusion processes, depending on the features or applications one wants to consider. There is also the consideration of recovery, and the possibility of latent states such as contagion without active infection, which have been modeled in the epidemiology literature.

or must make a choice when they care how their decisions match with others (as in games on networks).²² For instance, in the case of technology diffusion, a given individual's behavior might depend on which technology the majority of an individual's neighbors use. Outcomes in this case are driven by the structure of the network, but now in the context of multiple equilibria and more complicated interactions on a local level. In addition, it may be that individuals manipulate information so as to deliberately shift the opinions and actions of others, which adds a further layer to the process (e.g., Bloch, Demange, and Kranton 2015 and Chatterjee and Dutta 2015). There is a growing literature on such strategic interactions in networks (e.g., Jackson and Yariv 2007; Lopez-Pintado 2008; Galeotti et al. 2010), which is surveyed by Jackson and Zenou (2015); Bramoullé and Kranton (2016).²³

To discuss some of the implications of strategic decisions, consider, for example, incorporating the possibility of costly immunization into an analysis of disease diffusion. If agents can choose to immunize before the diffusion process takes hold, the results on density and degree distributions can change dramatically. The main idea is that, if the density of connections increases, then the incentive to immunize increases as well. The higher density puts upward pressure on diffusion, but the higher immunization rate puts downward pressure on immunization. The combined effects in equilibrium can result in a *lower* prevalence in the denser society.²⁴ More generally, it is clear that the

incorporation of agents' incentives into diffusion models is important and will produce insights that go beyond the existing conclusions that rely more on exogenous decision rules. Indeed, consider the choice of an individual who has to decide whether or not she wants to receive a vaccination. The optimal choice depends on the choices of the people she is linked to. There is typically imperfect information in that individuals have a good sense of the aggregate number of others who make a similar vaccination choice, but do not know the identity of these people and the ones with whom they are connected. In a series of laboratory experiments, Charness et al. (2014) show that players tend to vaccinate if their degree is above a certain threshold and less otherwise, and, moreover, that the frequency of active players increases with connectivity.

Much of the literature, and hence our discussion, has concerned the eventual, or steady-state, outcomes of diffusion processes. Beyond such a consideration, one may also be interested in the dynamics of the diffusion process itself, which lead through some time path from an initial seed to a steady-state outcome obtained in the long run. The question of which networks will be conducive to faster contagions is clearly distinct from the question of which networks will lead to higher prevalence in the long run. One property here that is important is the path lengths connecting agents (recall the discussion from section 3.1.5). One would expect that nodes that are closer will pass information (or behaviors) more quickly from one to another, and thus the steady state may be reached more quickly.

Redundancy in the network will also play an important role. That is, nodes that have many distinct paths between them, as opposed to a unique path, are more robustly connected. This becomes particularly relevant in situations where links are "active" probabilistically. In such a case, one may

²² For more discussion around this mechanical/strategic distinction, see Jackson (2008b).

²³ There is also an important literature on dynamic networks. For recent surveys, see Özgür (2011) and Pin and Rogers (2016).

²⁴ Papers that contribute to this line of modeling and derive such a result include Geoffard and Philipson (1997), Kremer (1996), Toxvaerd (2012), and Galeotti and Rogers (2015).

wish to consider the probability that information diffuses from one node to another. Redundant connections will increase this probability and hence make diffusion more likely to occur.

In summary, some basic aspects of overall network structure, such as the distribution of degrees, can have important consequences for a variety of processes, such as diffusion and learning, in well-defined ways.

5. *Characteristics of Nodes and Macro Patterns of Interaction: Homophily and Segregation*

Next, let us discuss the remaining macro characteristics of a network: homophily and segregation patterns. Examining the impact of homophily and its roots has been one of the more active and interesting areas of recent study relating network structure to behavior. There are a number of insights that can be found looking across this literature. Most basically, homophily enables different patterns of behavior to persist across different groups. This happens through a variety of mechanisms, some of them more mechanical and others more richly strategic. If a network has strong homophily then, as most links are, by definition, within groups, there are relatively fewer bridges across groups. As a consequence, when a contagion that is spread through contact that requires more than just one interaction is seeded in one group, the diffusion can remain confined within certain areas of the network, or take a very long time to reach other parts of the network. Similarly, if one enriches the process so that people are viewed as making active choices and, for instance, wish to match choices of their neighbors, such as adopting a new technology, then one can end up with different norms of behavior, technologies, or standards across groups in the network, and these can be persistent. Moreover, these equilibria are generally strict, and so can be viewed as

quite resilient to change. In addition, opinions are often formed in part by talking with others, and in this context homophily biases who talks to whom, and can thus slow social learning and allow for different beliefs to persist, even about basic facts. The impact of homophily on these different types of interactions has been explored in the literature, and some fundamental conclusions have emerged.

For instance, when subjects in experimental labs repeatedly play games that involve coordination among multiple equilibria, they often eventually coordinate successfully (e.g., Cooper et al. 1990; Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil 1990; Banks, Plott, and Porter 1988). Conventions, which operate through social norms, can guide expected behaviors and help people coordinate in settings in which there are multiple possible stable (equilibrium) outcomes. For instance, one can consider questions of whether people are polite in their exchanges, are corrupt, obey certain laws prohibiting smoking or drug use, or whether university departments hire their own students or ones from other universities, which technology or standard people adopt, and so forth. What is focal in the presence of multiple equilibria is not always obvious, and so one can expect that different conventions or expectations might arise in different cultures. In particular, with high levels of homophily, groups can become insular and then sustain different conventions (e.g., Morris 2000). Homophily can also affect whether information flows easily from one group to another or is instead impeded (e.g., Golub and Jackson 2012). These effects can have pronounced implications across a range of important applications including access to employment opportunities (Granovetter 1974; Mamaros and Sacerdote 2002; Munshi 2003; Calvó-Armengol and Jackson 2004, 2007; Ioannides and Datcher Loury 2004; Jackson 2007; Bayer, Ross, and Topa 2008; Beaman 2012; Laschever 2011; Patacchini

and Zenou 2012b; Gautier and Holzner forthcoming; Rubineau and Fernandez 2013; Battu, Seaman, and Zenou 2011; and Zenou 2013, 2015), social mobility (Calvó-Armengol and Jackson 2009, Munshi and Rosenzweig 2009, and Bervoets and Zenou 2017), marriage markets (Skopek, Schulz, and Blossfeld 2011), health behavior (Centola 2011), and educational achievement (Calvó-Armengol, Patacchini, and Zenou 2009). For example, in the labor market, homophily isolates workers of one ethnicity from workers of another ethnicity, which then limits the extent to which individuals in one group hear about openings and opportunities known to the other group. This effective separation in opportunities can lead to poverty traps, since if few of an individual's friends invest in education or are employed, then this lowers the returns to education and employment and so makes it less attractive for the individual to become educated and search for a job. This can lead to persistent differences in education, employment, wages, and incarceration rates across groups.

Shared history and expectations help people from a similar background to predict each others' behaviors with more accuracy than they predict the behavior of people with different backgrounds. In laboratory settings, people do indeed play differently in simple games such as ultimatum, dictator, and public-good provision depending on their cultural background—with subjects deviating from self-interested play and with levels of cooperation dependent upon their backgrounds (Henrich, Heine, and Norenzayan 2010). As people can better predict similar individuals' behaviors, this leads to beliefs that are closer to common knowledge and can facilitate coordination, whereas interacting with people from different cultures can lead to costly miscoordinations in behavior (Jackson and Xing 2014). These consequences, in turn, can reinforce the homophily. Since it is easier to

coordinate behaviors with similar others, it can be advantageous to form relationships with similar others.

Another important insight is that homophily has countervailing effects on diffusion and social learning processes. On the one hand, increased density within groups accelerates and strengthens diffusion and learning within a group, but then the decreased interactions across groups can slow or even eliminate broader spreads. This sort of pattern is found in recent laboratory experiments on coordination of behavior (e.g., voting, Kearns et al. 2009), trust (Goeree et al. 2010; Currarini and Mengel 2016), in a field experiment on the convergence of political opinions of French students (Algan et al. 2015), and is also seen in theoretical results on learning processes (Bala and Goyal 2001; Golub and Jackson 2012; Dandekar, Goel, and Lee 2013) and diffusion processes (Jackson and Lopez-Pintado 2013). What is perhaps most interesting is that homophily can actually enhance widespread diffusion. For instance, by having more homophily, one might actually increase the likelihood of a society-wide diffusion: increased density within groups allows a process to get a toehold and incubate within a group, and then eventually spread to a larger population (Jackson and Lopez-Pintado 2013), whereas in a less homophilous society, there may not exist dense enough clusters of relationships to foster the diffusion reaching critical mass in the first place.

Financial contagion is also an important topic in which homophily (in the form of specific correlations in the interaction structure of organizations) offers some insights. Indeed, since the recent financial crisis, the discourse about bank safety has widened from viewing the riskiness of financial institutions as individual firms to also understanding and quantifying systemic risk. Interconnections among financial institutions create potential channels for contagion and amplification of

shocks. Furthermore, the way the institutions are financially connected is crucial for understanding the risk exposure of the system as a whole where shocks to some of its parts can develop into a wider breakdown of banks and financial institutions through cascades of insolvencies and domino effects (see Gai, Haldane, and Kapadia 2011).

Consider, for example, four banks located in four different regions that are linked through their balance sheets and face negatively correlated liquidity shocks (Allen and Gale 2000). In such a situation, it can be optimal for banks to hold part of their deposit base in other regions to provide liquidity in times of elevated liquidity demand in their own region. In the case of a banking crisis in one region, the claims of other banks on this region lose value and can cause a banking crisis in the adjacent regions. The crisis can gain momentum and spread in a contagion effect to all regions. As a result, contagion can spread more easily if the network topology has the form of a circular exposure of one region against its neighboring regions. On the contrary, if the regions are fully connected, the network is more resilient in absorbing losses. More generally, financial contagion can exhibit a form of phase transition as interbank connections increase: as long as the magnitude and the number of negative shocks affecting financial institutions are sufficiently small, more complete interbank claims enhance the stability of the system (Allen and Gale 2000; Freixas, Parigi, and Rochet 2000). However, beyond a certain point, such interconnections start to serve as a mechanism for propagation of shocks and lead to a more fragile financial system (Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi 2015; Elliott, Golub, and Jackson 2014).²⁵ In sum, there are strong

connections between the financial network architecture and the likelihood of systemic failures due to contagion of counterparty risk (Cohen-Cole, Patacchini, and Zenou 2015).²⁶

Returning to social, as opposed to financial, networks, there are also interesting interactions between homophily and geographic segregation. There is some evidence that even slight ethnic preferences in friendships and social interactions can lead to separation in a geographical space (Schelling 1971; Cutler, Glaeser, and Vigdor 1999; Patacchini and Zenou 2016; de Marti and Zenou forthcoming). The essential insight, first exposed by Schelling (1971), is that once the minority (e.g., racial) share in a neighborhood exceeds a critical *tipping point* some majority group members may have a (slight) preference to leave (see also Card, Mas, and Rothstein 2008). This can then start a cascade in which other majority members move

This means that the relative intensity of nodes' connections with others can vary between their own group and other groups. This captures the difference between integration across industries and integration within industries. It can be shown (Elliott, Golub, and Jackson 2014) that increasing homophily can eventually sever connections between groups of organizations and lead to lower financial contagion. This is because lower-degree networks fragment at lower levels of homophily than high degree networks. So at high levels of homophily, lower-degree networks can actually be more robust.

²⁶Modeling network topology and default cascades helps identify critical institutions in a banking system. For instance, one can provide a measure of resilience that allows for a given network to predict the spread of distress (Amini, Cont, and Minca 2012, 2016). One can also determine a threat index, which measures the decrease in payment within the banking system following a reduction in net worth at one institution (Demange forthcoming). The latter is related to the intercentrality measure of the key player (Ballester, Calvó-Armengol, and Zenou 2006 and Zenou 2016) described in section 7, below. In both cases, it would be optimal to target the institutions with the highest threat index and/or the highest intercentrality measure. Targeting these key banks may not necessarily mean restricting their numbers of connections because it could result in a financial architecture that is less efficient, more fragile, and harder to monitor (Gofman 2013). Background on various parts of this literature are provided by Summer (2013), Benoit et al. (2015), and Cabrales, Gale, and Gottardi (2016).

²⁵Consider a set of organizations (for instance, countries, industries, or sectors) linked through a network of financial interdependencies where segregation (homophily) among different segments of the economy prevails.

out as the racial composition shifts even further. This implies that, with only a modest preference of the racial majority to live next to others who are similar could result in nearly complete residential segregation because of the instability of intermediate points where one agent's residential location depends on the actions of other agents in the neighborhood. As a result, because of this kind of homophily-driven behavior, even a relatively small fraction of minority agents could cause the neighborhood to change from essentially a majority neighborhood to completely minority one. This phenomenon helps to explain a pattern in which blacks live in cities and whites in suburbs: for instance, American metropolitan areas are segregated by race, both by neighborhood and across jurisdiction lines. In 1980, after a century of suburbanization, 72 percent of metropolitan blacks lived in central cities, compared to 33 percent of metropolitan whites (Boustan 2010). The general point is that even slight homophilistic preferences can generate dramatically different outcomes compared to neutral preferences.

Because people often make deliberate choices when forming links, the empirical tests of the issues mentioned above and hence their policy implications are difficult to execute well because of the possible endogeneity of the network. The specific concern is often that individuals have unobserved characteristics that are associated with their outcomes, and that these characteristics are also associated with the decision to establish links. The precise mechanism that is often articulated assumes that individuals exhibit homophily in these unobserved characteristics, making it more likely that individuals with similar characteristics form links with each other. If these characteristics are also correlated with the outcomes of interest, researchers will find that individuals who are connected have correlated outcomes even in the absence of any true peer effects. For

example, a correlation between individuals and their peers in school performance may be due to an exposure to common factors (e.g., having good teachers) rather than to social interactions. We will address this endogeneity issue below (see section 8) and will argue that having a structural approach explicitly modeling homophily-related behaviors can be very helpful in dealing with this issue.

6. *Micro Analyses: Clustering and Local Interaction Patterns*

Having discussed the effects of large-scale network structure on aggregate behaviors and outcomes, we now shift the focus to individual outcomes. To illustrate the distinction in terms of a diffusion process, in the previous sections we were concerned with the total prevalence of a diffusion process; the local counterpart to that question is an assessment of the likelihood that a given individual will be infected, as a function of her local neighborhood in the network.

There are at least two different ways in which local patterns of social networks, in particular the extent to which there are "tightly knit" groups, relate to behavior. One is that information travels quickly and reliably among tightly clustered groups of people. For instance, if any individual misbehaves and his or her friends are all friends with each other, then if that news flows stochastically through the links in the network, this can lead many of his or her friends to quickly hear that news. In contrast, if the individual's friends do not know each other, then it can be that many of his or her friends never hear the news. One may be interested in the flow of information per se, but it could also be that the flow of information is important for strategic reasons, e.g., in order to provide information on which to condition future plays of a game. A second, somewhat related, effect is that groups of individuals who are tightly knit and largely friends with each other can more easily collectively

ostracize an individual, thereby enforcing social norms and behaviors. The local patterns of friendships are thus not only important in how information about behavior spreads, but also in how people are able to coordinate in responding to a behavior.

These aspects of social networks are related to basic theories of social capital (e.g., Coleman 1988 and Putnam 2000) that posit that closure and strongly reinforced relationships help foster cooperation. Those theories, however, have only recently been formally modeled and analyzed directly, rather than through a reduced form approach. A series of recent studies have provided detailed theories of exactly how structures of relationships might influence behavior, and which specific sorts of patterns in social networks we should be looking for in determining whether a society is well-adapted to fostering cooperative behaviors. In particular, there are several studies (Bloch, Genicot, and Ray 2008; Lippert and Spagnolo 2011; Jackson, Rodriguez-Barraquer, and Tan 2012; and Ali and Miller 2012, forthcoming) that have explored how having friends in common and other local clique structures can help enforce cooperative behavior.²⁷ The literature has investigated how this works through both communication and patterns of ostracism (Jackson, Rodriguez-Barraquer, and Tan 2012; Ali and Miller forthcoming), as well as social collateral (Karlan et al. 2009).

Let us begin by discussing in a bit more detail the idea that social networks that are highly clustered can enhance communication among the friends of a given individual. If networks are highly clustered, then an individual's misbehavior towards one of his or her friends can quickly become known to that individual's other friends, since they tend to have direct connections with the

aggrieved agent. Such networks allow agents to react to an individual's misbehavior in a timely manner. Anticipating the ability of one's friends to punish provides strong incentives to maintain cooperative behavior. To elaborate, to ensure that individuals contribute to some public good, or provide costly favors to others, and are generally cooperative, well-behaving individuals can be rewarded with high future reciprocity, and poorly behaving individuals can be punished with low future reciprocity. These rewards and punishments are then provided through the actions of that individual's friends and neighbors. If those friends and neighbors are made quickly aware of the individual's behavior, then they can react quickly. This is important for providing the right incentives, as the threat of a punishment in the near future will have the greatest scope for disciplining behavior. If instead the setting is such that it takes a long time for one's friends to learn of misbehavior, then it becomes difficult to provide incentives for individuals to behave according to some desired social norm. In an extreme case, networks that look more like trees can enable an individual to misbehave in some relationships and never have that information come back to affect other relationships (Raub and Weesie 1990; Lippert and Spagnolo 2011; and Ali and Miller 2012, forthcoming).²⁸

The second insight is that a pair of individuals who exchange favors or who enter into some other sort of nonbinding relationship can have stronger incentives to behave efficiently if they have friends in common, i.e., the notion of support discussed in

²⁷This idea can be viewed as a network embodiment of some related ideas of Ostrom (1990) of community monitoring and enforcement.

²⁸Beyond the basic idea that information flows help in enforcing behavior, there are interesting questions regarding the incentives to truthfully pass information about misbehavior (Ali and Miller 2012, forthcoming). For example, reporting misbehavior can lead to costly breakdowns in cooperative behavior, and so incentives also need to be balanced so that individuals observing some misbehavior have proper incentives to tell others, rather than to cover it up.

section 3.2.1 above. Those common friends can react to a misbehavior (in an incentive compatible manner) by ostracizing the individual, thereby providing incentives for that individual to behave cooperatively/efficiently. Without considering any issues of information passing, there is also a question as to how a society must be structured so that if an individual fails to provide favors when asked, the subsequent “punishment” leads to minimal disruptions in the cooperative behavior in the society at large. If two individuals have friends in common, then when one of them fails to provide a favor to another, i.e., going against an efficient social convention, then those common friends can refuse to provide future favors to the individual who failed to provide the favor. This requires only “local” disruptions in the efficient cooperation in a society, and need not affect other parts of the society, whereas without such local structures contagion of the breakdown of cooperation might spread more broadly, leading to more costly consequences. Indeed as found by Jackson, Rodriguez-Barraquer, and Tan (2012), for seventy-five villages in southern rural India, one sees a very high level of favor exchange relationships in which there are friends in common that support that relationship, and this support can be more prevalent when the relationships in question involve explicit favor exchange rather than being more purely social. They also find that the level of support is significantly higher than what would arise if links were formed at random and significantly higher than levels of clustering. There are also studies that suggest micro-network characteristics are related to money transfers and loan repayments (Karlan et al. 2009, 2010; Blumenstock, Eagle, and Fafchamps 2012; Alatas et al. 2016; and Breza and Chandrasekhar 2016) as well as risk sharing (Bloch, Genicot, and Ray 2008; Ambrus, Mobius, and Szeidl 2014; Alatas et al. 2016; and Mobius and Rosenblat 2016).

A different insight concerning how local patterns of networks influence behavior has less to do with incentives, but rather concerns behavior reinforcement. In particular, high clustering can have effects on diffusion in which behaviors exhibit complementarities. In situations where behaviors have high levels of complementarity (for instance, when an individual requires that many of his or her friends adopt a behavior before being willing to do so as well), high clustering can enable the behavior to be adopted at a local level. If the network is properly intertwined in terms of its local neighborhoods, then this can ultimately enhance diffusion as it allows for the reinforced interactions at a local level that are necessary to get the diffusion rolling. For example, by studying the spread of health behavior through a network-embedded population by creating an Internet-based health community containing 1,528 participants recruited from health-interest world wide websites, Centola (2010) shows that a network with more clustering is advantageous, even if the network as a whole has a larger diameter. Individual adoption was much more likely when participants received social reinforcement from multiple neighbors in the social network. The behavior spread farther and faster across clustered-lattice networks than across corresponding random networks.

The full understanding of the importance of local network structure is still in its infancy, as detailed studies of how these structures facilitate and reinforce information flows, and also provide incentives for behavior, have only recently emerged. It is also worth noting that useful measures of local structure should extend well beyond clustering and support, as other aspects of the neighborhoods of a node or link are important in reinforcements of behaviors, for instance. A good measure should ultimately be behaviorally important, analytically tractable, and lend itself to computation in applied work.

7. Micro Analyses: Centrality and Behavior

Another important area in which “micro” analyses of networks have been very useful is in understanding the role of individuals in learning, contagion, and diffusion processes, as well as understanding how differences between individuals might arise. Studying these topics involves defining an individual’s importance, influence, or centrality in a network.

As already discussed, there are many ways of measuring individual centrality in a network (see Wasserman and Faust 1994 and Jackson 2008b for overviews). Conceptually, centrality is fairly straightforward: we want to identify which nodes are in the “center” of the network. In practice, identifying exactly what we mean by “center” can be subtle, but often it involves issues of power or influence.

As mentioned above, there are roughly four different ways of measuring node centrality: connectivity, closeness, intermediation, and having well-connected neighbors. The simplest index of *connectivity* is the number of direct links stemming from each node in the network, also known as the *degree* of a node. *Closeness* and *decay* centrality are measures of how close an agent is to all other agents in the network. The most central agents can quickly interact with all others because they are close to all others. These measures of centrality capture how easily an individual reaches others; e.g., how informed a given individual is in the context of information flows. *Intermediation* is also clearly important in measuring centrality. This is what *betweenness* centrality captures. Consider identifying the shortest path between every pair of agents in the network. Betweenness centrality is equal to the number of these shortest paths on which the given agent lies. The idea is that intermediation between a given

pair of agents occurs most efficiently along the shortest path connecting them, and so a central agent will play an important role as an intermediary, or as a coordinator. Such central agents have more control over the flow of information in the network. As such betweenness is related to the notion of *structural holes* developed by Burt (1992), who postulates that social capital is created by a network in which people can broker connections between otherwise disconnected segments. The last class of centrality measures puts forward the importance of being connected to well-connected agents. This is what characterizes *eigenvector* centrality, which assigns relative scores to all agents in the network based on the concept that connections to high-scoring agents contribute more to the score of the agent in question than equal connections to low-scoring agents. It thus captures indirect reach so that being well-connected to well-connected others makes one more central. Google’s early versions of PageRank (Page et al. 1998) were closely related to eigenvector centrality and random walks on a network. Similarly, *Katz–Bonacich* centrality (due to Katz 1953 and Bonacich 1987) considers all possible paths in a network (not only the shortest ones) but assigns a lower weight to links that are further away from the agent. As a result, Katz–Bonacich centrality captures the influence an agent has not only on her friends, but on their connections, and so forth, with decreasing weight as one moves further away from the agent.

It should be clear from this discussion that notions of centrality are varied and nuanced enough so that it is critical to carefully consider the role of centrality for a given question of interest. As these different measures capture fundamentally different aspects of the position of a node in a network, they have different uses when trying to understand how a node’s position relates to different behaviors. The idea that more central people may exhibit different

behaviors from less central people appeared early in the literature, both in terms of theory (e.g., Simmel 1908; Katz and Lazarsfeld 1955; Burt 1992), as well as in empirical observations (Coleman et al. 1966).²⁹ More recent data have enabled much cleaner studies of such effects, and allowed researchers to understand the workings of centrality in much finer detail. For example, Christakis and Fowler (2010) combine Facebook data with observations of a flu contagion, showing that individuals with more friends were significantly more likely to be infected at an earlier time than less-connected individuals.³⁰

More generally, better-connected individuals are subjected to greater complementarities in behaviors, and also exude greater influence. The combination of these effects, for example, is seen in a tractable model of how behavior depends on network positions by Ballester, Calvó-Armengol, and Zenou (2006), which has been the foundation for empirical investigations that have found evidence that individual position in a network can have significant effects on an individual's educational attainment, as well as on that individual's friends (Calvó-Armengol, Patacchini, and Zenou 2009). More general models of interactions with complementarities make broad predictions about how individual behavior depends on position in a network, as well as how that translates into overall behavior in the network (Galeotti et al. 2010), and some of those predictions have recently been confirmed in laboratory settings (Charness et al. 2014). Indeed, in

an environment in which the agents are uncertain about the precise network structure, the latter show in a series of experiments that, in the presence of strategic complements, players are active if their degree is above a certain threshold and inactive otherwise. They also show that the frequency of active players increases with connectivity.

To emphasize that which measure of “centrality” or “influence” is appropriate to predict behavior is context-dependent, let us discuss an interesting historical example, namely, the rise to prominence of the Medici family in fifteenth-century Florence, as discussed by Padgett and Ansell (1993).³¹ The family was not the wealthiest nor the most politically prominent. Nonetheless, they eclipsed other families partly by leveraging their position in the network as a central connector: they had much higher betweenness centrality than others. This provided the Medici with important roles as an intermediary and coordinator, both politically and economically, sitting in a unique position to mobilize other families. Interestingly, the Medici do not stand out so dramatically when measured by other centrality concepts, and so using other centrality measures would not lead one to view the Medici as particularly central or influential. This does not mean that betweenness is a measure that performs well generally, but that it can be very useful in settings where being a connector or an intermediary is particularly important.

In models with behavioral complementarities, measures of a person's centrality need to incorporate aspects of the network beyond how many friends the individual has (i.e., degree centrality). For example, in cases in which there are strong complementarities in behaviors such as in crime

²⁹For example, Mehra, Kilduff, and Brass (2001) find that workers with higher betweenness centrality perform better in the workplace.

³⁰There are some exceptions to this insight. For example, if individuals strategically transmit information (Hagenbach and Koessler 2010), then they may deliberately hide information that they may not wish to spread from better-connected individuals, something that has been found in theoretical (Lee and Persson 2010) and empirical investigations (Banerjee, Breza, Chandrasekhar, Duflo, and Jackson 2014).

³¹See Jackson (2008b) for more details on the centrality measures in this example.

or education, Katz–Bonacich centrality has proven useful in describing the activity of each agent (Ballester, Calvó-Armengol, and Zenou 2006). If, for instance, we consider a game with complementarities where the utility depends on the profile of actions in an appropriate (linear) way, then the best-response mappings essentially become identical to the centrality relationships, and the equilibrium condition is equivalent to the solution of equations from which centrality is derived. This should not come as a great surprise since, as stated above, the Katz–Bonacich centrality belongs to the a class of centrality measures for which the centrality of an agent is recursively related to the centralities of the agents she is connected to. This is clearly related to the fixed-point argument of the Nash equilibrium in actions, since the best-reply function of each agent is such that the action of an agent (i.e., his/her centrality measure) depends only on her set of neighbors and their centralities. This is the essence of the Katz–Bonacich centrality, which mainly captures the importance of feedback and social multiplier effects.

Revisiting the crime example, the most central agents (in terms of Katz–Bonacich centrality) in a given network are also the most active criminals. Quite naturally, this leads to interesting policy implications in terms of crime reduction. One could target “key players” in a network in order to reduce total crime. Specifically, if we could choose to push one person’s criminal activity to zero and remove all her existing links from the network, which player’s removal would lead to the highest overall criminal activity reduction when accounting for equilibrium effects? Here again, centrality measures can help in determining such a key player. The *intercentrality measure* (Ballester, Calvó-Armengol, and Zenou 2006; Ballester, Zenou, and Calvó-Armengol 2010; Ballester and Zenou 2014;

and Zenou 2016), which not only looks at how central an agent is, but also at how this agent contributes to the centrality of others, helps define key players in networks. It turns out that the intercentrality measure is useful not only in reducing crime (Lee et al. 2012 and Lindquist and Zenou 2014), but also in determining which firm(s) should be subsidized in research and development networks in order to maximize total activity (König, Liu, and Zenou 2014) or which bank(s) should be bailed out in order to avoid a financial crisis (Denbee et al. 2013).

The usefulness of Katz–Bonacich related measures has also been confirmed empirically in a context of peer effects. Looking at education performance of fourth graders in rural Bangladesh, Hahn et al. (2015) randomly allocate these students to groups of four. They show that, if a student (randomly) ends up in a group with high centrality, he or she tends to perform better both individually and collectively. Hahn et al. (2015) also show that the Katz–Bonacich centrality is a key determinant of this performance, and that other centralities, such as the betweenness and the eigenvector centrality, matter less. These results and the ones mentioned above indicate that there is a class of centrality measures (Katz–Bonacich, eigenvector, and diffusion centrality) that can predict relatively well the impact of peers on criminal and educational behaviors, and can explain the importance of certain individuals in a diffusion process. Of course, the intercentrality measure (key player) is context dependent, relies on estimating the peer-effect model, and may not be appropriate in other contexts.

In contrast, when studying the diffusion of information, Katz–Bonacich centrality is not necessarily a strong predictor of which people are the most influential seeds for the process; other centrality measures can outperform it. Indeed, in investigating micro-finance diffusion in forty-three different

villages, Banerjee et al. (2013)³² find that the degrees of the first contacted individuals (i.e., the set of original injection points in a village) are not significantly correlated with the extent of the eventual diffusion, nor are their Katz–Bonacich centralities. Instead, the eigenvector centrality of the initial injection points, and a related, more general, centrality measure based directly on modeling diffusion (“diffusion centrality”), are the only significant predictors of eventual diffusion in their data. More generally, eigenvector-related centralities have been shown to have both theoretical and empirical importance in various settings, including whether a society efficiently aggregates information (Golub and Jackson 2010), how much criminal activity a society engages in (Calvó-Armengol and Zenou 2004; and Ballester, Zenou, and Calvó-Armengol 2010), and how a society can best mitigate externalities (Elliott and Golub 2015).

To varying extents, centrality measures extend readily to the domain of networks that are described by weighted and directed links, or by multigraphs. As a simple illustration, when links are directed, then one can distinguish between in-degree and out-degree. The recursive formulations of centrality, in their formal definitions, already apply directly to weighted graphs. Closeness and betweenness can readily be extended to multigraph settings.

New studies of centrality are providing us with more knowledge about the similarities and differences between different measures of centrality, and provide us with better ideas of which ones might be appropriate for different applications. For example, Banerjee, Chandrasekhar, Duflo, and Jackson 2014 show that degree, eigenvector, and Katz–Bonacich centralities are all special cases

(different extreme points) of the notion of “diffusion centrality” that they defined in Banerjee et al. (2013). In particular, each of these notions is defined via walks emanating from nodes, with degree just looking at walks of length one and the others accounting for walks of all lengths emanating from a given node, and diffusion centrality allowing for all variations in walk length, thus nesting all three of the other centrality notions. Furthermore, using the insight that eigenvector and Katz–Bonacich centralities belong to the same class of centrality measures for which the centrality of an agent is recursively related to the centralities of the agents she is connected to, Dequiedt and Zenou (2014) propose an axiomatic characterization of these classes of centrality measures using similar axioms for variations on the centrality measures, and Bloch, Jackson, and Tebaldi (2015) provide characterizations for families of centrality measures including those mentioned above and others—showing exactly what they have in common and how they differ. Continuing to bring more discipline to how we measure centrality, and when we use which measures, is important.

While centrality notations are useful to researchers, one might question whether people embedded in a network, but unaware of its details, could nonetheless identify highly central people. If so, how might people come to know who is influential in their community? Using data from the same villages in India, Banerjee, Chandrasekhar, Duflo, and Jackson 2014 show that people living in these villages are fairly accurate at identifying those who are most central in their villages. They also show that this ability can come from simply listening to gossip through their networks: in the model, people hear information about others according to a simple gossip process in proportion to those nodes’ abilities to diffuse information (according to diffusion centrality), and thus simply by naming

³²See also Cai, de Janvry, and Sadoulet (2015) who study the influence of social networks on the decision to adopt a new weather-insurance product in rural China.

people they hear about most frequently, they can identify those best able to diffuse information.

While the notion that centrality matters in various diffusion and influence settings is long standing, the science of distinguishing how to best measure centrality and which measures have consequences in which economic settings is still maturing.

8. *Endogeneity of Networks and Other Empirical Challenges*

Having discussed some of the major insights from our taxonomy outlined in section 3, both empirical and theoretical, we now discuss some of the major challenges faced when doing empirical analyses of behaviors and effects that occur in the context of social networks. A prominent topic that falls into this category is that of peer effects, which arise in many settings and impact a wide range of policy decisions. The estimation of peer effects and other network processes are complicated by several factors, to which we now turn.

The challenges in accurately estimating interactive effects in networked settings include:³³

1. Identification: a model of behavior on networks must be specified so that individuals' influences on one another can be identified and distinguished from other sources of influence.
2. Endogenous networks and homophily: people have proclivities to link to others similar to themselves, both on observed (to the researcher) characteristics and unobserved characteristics that could influence their behavior. By failing to account for similarities in (unobserved) characteristics,

similar behaviors might be mistakenly attributed to interactive effects when they are actually due to underlying characteristics or exposure to common stimuli.

3. Computation: the set of possible networks is exponential in population size, which raises substantial computational hurdles in modeling endogenous network formation, as the relative probability of seeing the observed network often needs to be compared to other possibilities when estimating how the observed network of relationships depends on observed and unobserved characteristics.
4. Measurement error: relationships are observed with noise and often only at specific points in time, and so the observed network may be an imperfect proxy for the true set of relevant interactions.³⁴
5. Misspecification: there are many different functional forms that could describe how neighbors' behaviors interact with each other, and seemingly small changes in the model, including omitting variables, can lead to large changes in predicted behaviors.
6. Multiple types of relationships: individuals interact in many ways and few datasets track all interactions, so it is difficult to fully identify the mechanisms by which nodes influence one another.

³³This taxonomy is drawn from Jackson (2013) (see also Jackson 2014).

³⁴Indeed, observational data on social networks is often incomplete. For a discussion of measurement error in social networks, see Chandrasekhar and Lewis (2012). They propose a set of corrections for commonly used network statistics and a two-step estimation procedure using graphical reconstruction.

Several of these issues are well-studied in broader contexts, especially as some are not unique to networked settings. Nonetheless, others are just beginning to be understood and systematically addressed.

Let us discuss the first two of these challenges in the context of measuring peer effects in education. For example, consider the estimation of how a student's test scores or grades depends on her own characteristics and the performance of her peers, as well as other potential influences such as the characteristics of her peers.

A first challenge is the fact that the mutual interaction between behaviors can make it difficult to disentangle the effects of individual and group characteristics from the influences of each others' behaviors. For example, an individual's grades may depend on his or her peers' grades, as well as on other background characteristics. But then the peers' grades depend, for their part, on the individual's grades, which are also influenced by the characteristics. The system of equations that is defined in order to sort out the precise interactions can be indeterminant. In the context of linear interaction models, this issue was termed the *reflection problem* in an important paper by Manski (1993). There are various and more flexible specifications for the patterns of effects for which the potential indeterminacy can be overcome, including ones in which the peer effects operate in nonlinear ways (see Brock and Durlauf 2001a; Blume et al. 2011). Although the reflection problem was an important issue in the early peer-effects literature, since it prompted researchers to think carefully about model specification and identification, it has since become clear that it applies mostly to a sort of simple reduced-form model, and is not an issue in many other micro-founded models. For instance, as emphasized by Blume et al. (2011) and Blume et al. (2015), the reflection problem is functional-form dependent—not applying

to many nonlinear models, and being even nongeneric in linear models. An additional, complementary insight is that network information, rather than only group-level information, can enable identification, as then the full feedback patterns pointed out by Manski (1993) can be disentangled by taking advantage of the fact that different individuals have different sets of peers, and therefore different exposures and net effects, as shown by Bramoullé, Djebbari, and Fortin (2009).³⁵

A major concern with the interpretation of parameter estimates from this type of estimation is that correlations in residual outcomes (e.g., grades or test scores after controlling for the individual characteristics such as parental income and education, etc.) between peers need not be the (causal) effect of peer behaviors. Instead, these correlations may be at least partly due to some correlated but unobserved characteristics. More specifically, individuals who are peers may be similar in terms of unobserved characteristics that also affect the outcomes, generating correlation in outcomes between peers as a result. Consider, for example, a youth's decision to initiate drug use. Is it because his/her friend initiated drug use (endogenous peer effects)? Or is it due to the fact that some peer background characteristics, such as common exposure to a substance-abusing parent that caused both children to adopt the same behavior? Or is it because they live in a neighborhood with special characteristics? The ability to distinguish between these explanations is crucial for policy purposes. When true peer influence (or other sorts of diffusion) effects operate, intervening to alter one child's behavior may affect others' behaviors as well (*social multiplier effects*). Absent such peer effects, but when children initiate substance use because adults in their

³⁵See Blume et al. (2015) and de Marti and Zenou (2015) for discussions of equilibrium as well as identification issues with partial network knowledge.

environment provide opportunities to do so, these multiplier effects would not exist. Correctly distinguishing social interaction from other effects is thus important in accurately gauging the benefits of interventions, and therefore to making a proper assessment of the welfare consequences of such policies (e.g., see Brock and Durlauf 2001a).

One way that this problem has been addressed in the literature (Bramoullé, Djebbari, and Fortin 2009; Calvó-Armengol, Patacchini, and Zenou 2009; and Boucher and Fortin 2016) is to exploit the architecture of network contacts to construct instrumental variables for the social interaction effect. Since peer groups are individual-specific in social network contexts (usually, different people have different groups of friends (i.e., different local neighborhoods) in rich enough ways that allow for identification, the characteristics of indirect friends are natural candidates. The idea is that a change in the action of a friend of a friend only interacts with a friend's behavior and not directly with the individual's behavior.

This brings us to the second major challenge outlined above: the endogeneity of the network itself.³⁶ Unfortunately, the sort of instrumental variable strategy described above is valid only if the network can be treated as exogenous, which is not usually the case unless one has access to an appropriately controlled field experiment. For example, suppose that the decision to form a friendship is dictated by the choices of the individuals involved. The decision is likely to depend on the joint characteristics of the two agents, not only in terms of observed characteristics, but also in terms of unobserved characteristics that could influence their behaviors. It could then be that behaviors of friends of friends are correlated in ways

that invalidate instrumenting on friends of friends as a method to identify peer effects.

Properly accounting for these possible unobserved factors that correlate with network formation then requires one to be lucky enough to have data where the network was formed exogenously (e.g., see Carrell, Fullerton, and West 2009; Carrell, Sacerdote, and West 2013; Algan et al. 2015; and Lindquist, Sauermann, and Zenou 2015), or to be able to plausibly rule out unobserved factors, or to develop instruments that are plausibly exogenous to the interaction structure, or else explicitly model network formation and try to account for factors that could have substantial influences on behaviors and also on network formation.³⁷

In many situations, controls and effective instruments for network formation may be underpowered, and a careful modeling of network formation can help account for the endogeneity of the network.³⁸ As above, a basic issue that needs to be accounted for in so doing is that, under homophily, linked individuals are likely to be similar both on observed and unobserved characteristics. For example, youths who are relatively under-supervised (in terms of parental attention) may form friendships with others who are under-supervised, and so forth. Without fully accurate measurements of all the characteristics that might affect friendship formation, one has to infer the process of formation to account for the missing data. Otherwise, if the variables that drive this

³⁷See, e.g., Acemoglu, Garcia-Jimeno, and Robinson (2015), who study the direct and spillover effects of local state capacity using the network of Colombian municipalities. They exploit both the structure of the network of municipalities over which spillovers take place, and then the historical roots of local state capacity as a source of exogenous variation.

³⁸Even when careful controls, natural experiments, or other instruments are readily available, having some theory behind the formation process can be essential in properly structuring an analysis and identifying (alternative) hypotheses.

³⁶See Blume et al. (2011) for discussion of how issues of selection fundamentally differ from the identification of a model itself.

process of network formation are not fully observable, potential correlations between these unobserved factors and the target regressors are potentially major sources of bias, as they correlate with patterns of interaction and then are mis-attributed to peer interaction. The scale of this bias can be large in practice, as pointed out by Aral, Muchnik, and Sundararajan (2009).

One approach to dealing with unobserved correlations comes from Goldsmith-Pinkham and Imbens (2013).³⁹ The idea is as follows. Under homophily, pairs of friends tend to be more similar than pairs of non-friends in terms of their observed and unobserved traits. Thus, if one sees two people who are friends but are not similar along observed traits, then they are more likely to be similar along unobserved traits. Similarly, if two individuals are similar on observed traits but are not friends, then they are more likely to be dissimilar in the full profile of unobserved traits. If one writes down an explicit model for how friendships might depend on observed and unobserved traits, then this perspective allows one to infer the likelihood that different pairs of individuals are similar or different on *unobserved* traits. Once one infers similarities on unobserved traits, then it is possible to correct for the effects of those traits on behaviors and remove some of the bias that comes from simply ignoring the presence of such traits. Goldsmith-Pinkham and Imbens (2013) illustrate this in the context of a simple network-formation model, but one could enrich the model to address some of the further concerns we discuss below.⁴⁰

³⁹One can also jointly estimate a model of behavior and network formation as in Badev (2013), Patacchini, Rainone, and Zenou (forthcoming), and Auerbach (2016).

⁴⁰Brock and Durlauf (2001b), Blume et al. (2011), and Blume et al. (2015) describe how to use selection corrections to address endogenous social structure. In particular, Blume et al. (2015) propose a variant of the control function invented in Heckman (1979) and extended in Heckman and Robb (1986) to address the endogeneity of networks. The fundamental idea of Heckman is that

This brings us to the third challenge in working with network data and properly accounting for the endogeneity of the networks: computing models of network formation.⁴¹ Generally, the formation of links in a network is not independent across pairs of individuals, and there will often be strong correlations across pairs in the presence of relationships. There are many possible reasons underlying such correlations. People meet each other through friends of friends (e.g., Jackson and Rogers 2007a). People may benefit from the indirect connections that others bring (e.g., Jackson and Wolinsky 1996; Sheng 2014; and de Paula, Richards-Shubik, and Tamer 2015) and may have more general preferences over connections (e.g., Menzel 2016). People may wish to have their friends be friends with each other (e.g., under structural balance theory as in Cartwright and Harary 1956). Having tight cliques of friends may help enforce behaviors that are not otherwise sustained in a network without cliques or local clustering and support (Coleman 1988; Jackson, Rodriguez-Barraquer, and Tan 2012; Ali and Miller 2012; Comola and Prina 2013; Feigenberg, Field, Pande, Rigol, and Sarkar 2014; and Banerjee, Chandrasekhar, Dufflo, and Jackson 2016). People might also be forming links based on homophily or location (Graham 2014; Leung 2014), which then leads to correlation if not all characteristics are observed. This means that one cannot model network formation on a link-by-link basis, but rather must explicitly

self-selection can be incorporated into the analysis, rather than using instrumental variables. The idea that selection on unobservables can aid in identification of social effects via control functions was first shown in Brock and Durlauf (2001b). See Del Bello, Patacchini, and Zenou (2015) for an application of the control-function approach to study network effects in education.

⁴¹For recent surveys of the econometrics of network formation, see Chandrasekhar (2016), de Paula (2016), and Graham (2015), and for background on strategic network formation see Jackson (2008b) and Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2016).

account for interdependencies in how sets of links are formed. Once one does this, to fully confront the resulting structure, one is then faced with specifying a model at the network level as opposed to, say, the link level.

There is a powerful and natural formulation of such models known as “exponential random graph models (ERGMs or p^* models—see Robins et al. 2007 and Jackson 2008b for background) that incorporate such interdependencies. The ERGM model class can nest any random graph model, can incorporate arbitrary interdependencies in connections and admit a variety of strategic (choice-based) network formation models, and so it is quite flexible and powerful. However, because the number of possible networks on a given set of nodes is an exponential function of the number of nodes, it is practically impossible to estimate the likelihood of a given network at even a moderately large scale and thus there is an important computational hurdle that must be overcome in working with data (see the discussion in Chandrasekhar and Jackson 2014).⁴² Thus, one somehow needs models of networks that incorporate the link dependencies observed in the data, but yet allow for practical estimation.

One approach around this obstacle is, instead of modeling network effects at either the link level (and thus failing to incorporate interdependencies) or the full network level (and thus failing computability), to model things at a subnetwork level, which

is then computable and also allows for rich sets of link interdependencies, as shown by Chandrasekhar and Jackson (2014, 2015). Another approach is to model the network as an evolving process as in Price (1976); Barabasi and Albert (1999); Jackson and Rogers (2007a); Snijders (2001); Christakis et al. (2010); Mele (forthcoming); and König, Tessone, and Zenou (2014), as such models allow for dependencies in that new links form at various points in time based on the network currently existing at the time of formation. For instance, network formation can be modeled as a sequential process where in each period a single randomly selected agent (or pair of agents) has the opportunity to form a link. A key assumption in these models that enables tractability is that agents either follow some rule of thumb (e.g., preferential attachment) or act to maximize their payoffs but do not take into account possible future changes to the network. This avoids complications with the presence of multiple equilibria, and can also greatly simplify the computational burden of analyzing these models. All of these models have yet to be integrated back with explicit models of individual behavior and potentially of latent characteristics (as in Goldsmith-Pinkham and Imbens 2013), which is a natural next step. A challenge here is in making the dynamic models rich enough to fit a multitude of applications, and yet still retaining computability.⁴³

Finally, there is much that can still be accomplished with partial identification. Indeed, it can be enough to put constraints on the relationships between variables to rule out certain patterns in the data, and this can be done without a fully identified model of network formation (e.g., Brock and Durlauf 2007). Partial identification approaches have

⁴²Any model that specifies probabilities at a network level then has to be estimated by comparing the likelihood (or conditional probability if Bayesian) of the observed network to other potential networks. As the number of networks explodes exponentially with the number of nodes, one would then have to estimate probabilities of alternative networks via sampling rather than exhaustive calculation. Unfortunately, standard sampling methods based on Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) techniques do not work, except in extreme cases, as shown by Bhamidi, Bresler, and Sly (2008); and yet those models are being widely applied even though the estimation of parameters as well as standard errors may be inaccurate.

⁴³Transition dynamics can contain distinct information from steady-state behavior (Brock and Durlauf 2010) and a dynamic generalization of Manski’s linear-in-means model can be identified (Brock and Durlauf 2001b).

been very successful in some areas, such as finance and industrial organization (e.g., Hansen and Jagannathan 1991 and Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes 1995), but have mostly not been applied in network settings. More generally, the scientific method examines predictions of the models and rejects them when their predictions fail, which does not always require full identification. In particular, it may be easier to identify that a model fails to hold, than that it does hold—it is not a symmetric undertaking. Of course, not rejecting a model or theory does not then imply causation, but it is still possible to make substantial progress by rejecting models and then replacing them. This observation may be particularly relevant to the modeling of network formation, which, because of various challenges mentioned above, faces full-identification hurdles. There is a vast middle ground that is not as ambitious as proving causation, utilizing instead partial or limited identification, and which should not be overlooked, as it is still very useful in pushing the science forward, especially for network formation.

9. *A Summary of Lessons and Themes Emerging from the Literature Relating Network Structure to Economic Behavior*

In this paper, we have highlighted the importance that social networks have in determining economic behaviors. In order to bring out the insights we have collected, we pull together and summarize some key components of our exposition.

First, regarding the macro analyses of networks and behavior:

1. The distribution of connectivity in a society is critical in fostering diffusion processes:
 - Many contagion or diffusion processes exhibit sharp phase transitions in how connected the

society is—less densely connected societies exhibit no diffusion and societies that have densities (slightly) above a critical threshold exhibit substantial diffusion;

- Not only does the average number of relationships per capita in a society matter, but higher variance in connectivity also matters since highly connected individuals can serve as hubs that facilitate diffusion and contagion.
 - The impact of the network's degree distribution depends on how the infection or behavior spreads from node to node.
2. Homophily and segregation patterns can both help and hinder diffusion:
 - High levels of homophily can lead groups to be insular and maintain different customs and behaviors from other groups, and can enable poverty traps and underinvestment due to complementarities in behaviors, as well as slow the spread of information across groups, but
 - High homophily can also help incubate behaviors or infections within one group that might not take hold otherwise, and then those behaviors or infections can spread to a whole society.

Next, regarding the micro analyses of networks and behavior:

1. The centrality of individuals can affect their behaviors and have implications for their influence on diffusion, learning, and behaviors in a society:
 - Better-connected individuals can hear new information sooner and have high levels of influence on

the eventual spread of information and/or the adoption of new products in a society.

- The notions of centrality that best predict the influence of a particular individual for diffusion and behaviors with complementarities are often based on iterative measures of how well-connected the individual's friends are (e.g., eigenvector, Katz–Bonacich and diffusion centralities).
 - The (many) different notions of centrality all capture different aspects that turn out to be important in different settings (betweenness for intermediation, Katz–Bonacich for games of complements, eigenvector and diffusion centrality for learning and diffusion, key player for reducing crime, distance and gossip centrality for informedness, degree for short-lived processes).
2. The extent to which an individual's friends are friends with each other, as well as the extent to which pairs of friends have friends in common, can have important implications for cooperative behavior:
- High clustering can help enable information spread about (mis) behaviors of an individual to his or her friends and help provide fast societal reactions and effective incentives.
 - Having friends in common can help in providing incentives to individuals to exchange favors.
 - Having high local clustering can help reinforce behaviors that exhibit complementarities and help them survive and spread, compared to what might occur in more dispersed network structures.

And finally, regarding the endogeneity of networks:

1. The endogeneity of friendships and social relationships is important to model and observe:
 - The substantial homophily that social networks exhibit can lead connected individuals to exhibit similar behaviors and beliefs, even after correcting for observed characteristics, which can substantially contaminate estimation of peer effects.
 - Statistical models of network formation need to incorporate elements beyond the link level in order to capture network effects.
 - Individuals may not have incentives to form relationships in ways that are most beneficial for a society.
 - The formation of friendships can be governed not only by the preferences of individuals, but also by biases in the opportunities that individuals have to meet each other as distorted both by individual characteristics and by existing network structure.

We have provided two sets of organizing principles. First, we have suggested a taxonomy of network properties, aimed at distinguishing between local and aggregate features of the network. Large networks are complicated objects and, given the inherent limitations involved in attempting to simplify and summarize them, it is useful to have in mind a classification of properties that capture essential properties of networks. Second, we have illustrated the importance that those network properties have for economic outcomes and behavior. The chosen contexts also demonstrate that the classification of network properties aligns with natural research questions.

Finally, we should like to emphasize that the overlap of theoretical and empirical work in network economics has been not only healthy for developing deeper understandings of how network structures matter in economics, but is also maturing to a point at which policy implications are emerging. Just as one example, in the context of criminal networks, it has been estimated that, not only can a key-player policy substantially reduce total crime in a network, but it can also outperform other reasonable—but, from a network perspective, naïve—police policies such as targeting the most active criminals (Lindquist and Zenou 2014). Moving forward, it is our hope and expectation that network economics will greatly aid in the understanding of policies in many arenas including poverty, development, education, public health, segregation, business cycles, finance, politics, and international relations.⁴⁴

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⁴⁴We have not been exhaustive in our discussion of topics, omitting discussion of whole subliteratures, such as those on the structure of networked markets and exchange (e.g., see Elliott and Golub 2015, Condorelli and Galeotti 2016, and Manea 2016), social learning (e.g., see Golub and Sadler 2016), labor markets (e.g., see Ioannides and Datcher Loury 2004, and Beaman 2016), international trade (e.g., see Chaney 2016), or political alliances (e.g., see Jackson and Nei 2015 and Dziubinski, Goyal, and Vigier 2016), to mention a few.

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